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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“ActionAid International was formed in recognition that we can have greater impact in our fight against poverty 
if we act in coalition and partnership with others at local, national and global levels. We believe that the solution 
to poverty lies in a global movement that is led by poor and excluded people acting against poverty, cutting across 
national and south-north boundaries. The founding of ActionAid International was our participation in, and 
contribution to, this movement.” (ActionAid 2010:6) 
 
During the last decade international coordination has become the new black in 
development cooperation. Spurred by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 
and the Accra Agenda for Action of 2008 (AAA) an increased focus on donor alignment 
and harmonisation has been emphasised by the OECD. This has influenced development 
practices of the OECD donors and as a result of this practices of the recipients of the 
OECD donors’ funds, first and foremost non-governmental development organisations 
(NGDOs).  
The donor conditionality to increase international coordination adds to an already 
existing pressure on NGDOs from academia and decision-makers, as well as the public to 
improve performance. During the past two decades the public accountability and 
economic efficiency of NGDOs have increasingly been questioned and larger NGDOs 
have been facing accusations of being overly bureaucratic and having lost connection to 
the grassroots. Further, the enhancing capacity of NGDOs in the South has resulted in a 
growing amount of donor support to NGDOs being channelled directly to southern-
based organisations, intensifying the pressure on northern-based NGDOs to justify their 
existence and relevance. In other words, northern-based NGDOs are facing significant 
challenges to continuously innovate and prove their worth. 
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NGDO coalitions and international policy advocacy 
To accommodate these challenges a number of NGDOs have chosen to increase 
transnational collaboration by joining forces based on a new model of international 
coalition. The structure of this model is characterised by being much more integrated than 
existing forms of international networks and differentiates itself from large international 
organisations like Plan International and CARE – which basically are networks of 
associated organisations – by comprising inherently different individual organisations. 
Further, this model is characterised by an explicit emphasis on the inclusion of 
organisations based in developing countries and by a constitutionally rooted democratic 
structure. Examples of this model include the originally British NGDO, ActionAid, which 
in 2003 evolved to the ActionAid International alliance (AAI) moving headquarters to 
South Africa and began affiliating other NGDOs under the ActionAid name. And ACT 
Alliance, which was formed in 2010 and now consists of more than 100 church-related 
organisations working in long-term development with a board and an executive 
committee. 
 
Converging with the tendency to form coalitions is a growing recognition among NGDOs 
that development projects isolated to local, regional or even national levels might not – 
due the architecture of global decision-making – suffice in the effort to create fundamental 
social change. It is argued that that selected intergovernmental organisations (IGO) 
(typically the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO) along with a handful of powerful states 
promote an economic agenda, which basically disregards social needs, and that this agenda 
is largely unchallenged. Katz, among others, asserts that the dominance of the political 
project of neoliberalism promoted by this convergence of states, transnational 
corporations and IGOs constitutes a hegemonic position in international decision-making 
(Katz 2006:335). Hegemony, in this context, refers to a condition in which one or more 
actors hold a dominant position over a group of subordinated actors through political or 
cultural dominance. NGDOs therefore increasingly engage in international policy 
advocacy (IPA) – defined as ‘attempts to influence change at a political level (Yanacopulos 
2005:100) – targeted at these IGOs. 
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Global civil society and Gramscian thought 
By engaging in international policy advocacy NGDOs, through coalitions such as those 
described above, can be considered part of what has been termed the global civil society 
(GCS). GCS is typically conceptualised as a “redemptive, semiautonomous political space in which 
popular organisations come together to create and participate in institutions of global governance” (Mundy 
and Murphy 2001:90) and considered to comprise a complex network of international 
nongovernmental organisations engaging in global politics – commonly referred to as 
transnational advocacy networks (TAN). 
However, the notion and actual potential of GCS is highly disputed in academia. One 
group of scholars assert that GCS can provide the means to improve or adjust the 
structure that allegedly obstructs a development towards more social equity throughout 
the world. While another group remain critical towards the ‘redemptive’ potential of GCS 
pointing to the lack of accountability, representativeness and even legitimacy of 
international organisations claiming to promote the interests of the poor. 
Mundy and Murphy identify three concepts that seem to perpetuate GCS literature: 
civility, democracy and contention. Considering GCS as basically progressive, ‘Civility’ 
refers to the ability of GCS to cultivate participation, reciprocity and social pluralism, while 
‘democracy’ refers to the representativeness and accountability towards the people the 
organisations comprising GCS claim to represent. Thus they represent ways of improving 
the existing structure. ‘Contention’ in a progressive sense refers to conducted advocacy 
efforts from GCS organisations as independent from and in opposition to existing 
structures organised by states and IGOs (Mundy and Murphy 2001:92f), thereby 
representing a questioning of the present structure. 
 
Critical perspectives on GCS typically emphasise the lack of capacity of the organisations 
and networks comprising GCS to challenge the existing hegemony. They question the 
capacity of GCS to be a space for contention. Rather, it is argued, GCS fails to address the 
fundamental structure of global decision-making by instead focusing on ways to improve 
the civility and democracy features of GCS, and thereby strengthens the existing structure 
by legitimising it. 
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Focus of research 
It is in this context the alternative coalition model raises some interesting questions. 
Particularly if the alternative structure of the model can function as platform for 
contention to challenge the dominant political agenda promoted by some of the most 
powerful economic powers globally. The objective of the present thesis is thus to answer 
the following research question: 
 
In which ways can the more integrated structure of NGDO coalitions be expected to influence the 
potential for ‘contention’ among organisations opposing the existing hegemony, and how does this affect 
the general critique of the contentious features of GCS? 
 
With a ‘more integrated structure’ I refer to a comparison of existing NGO structures in 
an IPA context, primarily transnational advocacy networks (TAN), which are the primary 
‘building blocks’ of GCS (Mundy and Murphy 2001:86). In Chapter 3 I argue how NGDO 
coalitions can be distinguished from the prevalent form of TANs through two features: 
their operational structure and their organisational structure. By operational structure I refer to 
how the internal links of NGDO coalitions can be expected to influence the interaction 
with IGOs, while by organisational structure I refer to how the composition of NGDO 
coalitions can be expected to influence the potential for contention. With the provided 
research question I thus wish to construct a hypothesis regarding the potential, or lack of 
potential, of NGDO coalition building to challenge the existing hegemony. To this end, I 
apply a neo-Gramscian framework, which provides theoretical instruments to analyse the 
determining factors for counter-hegemonic efforts. Departing from the constructed 
hypothesis I discuss whether NGDO coalitions can be expected to challenge or confirm 
the critical perspectives on GCS. 
As NGDO coalitions – in the form, which is the subject of this thesis – is a very recent 
phenomenon, theory concerning NGDO coalitions is very limited. However, separate 
theory concerning organisations engaged in international policy advocacy and theory 
concerning mechanisms behind the formation and characteristics of coalitions does exist. 
Drawing on this theory, on observations from one of the most progressive coalitions, 
ActionAid International, on neo-Gramscian thought and on theoretical perspectives on 
GCS, I address the following working questions: 
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o How do NGDO coalitions differ from transnational advocacy networks in terms 
of structure? 
o How can Gramscian and neo-Gramscian thought be applied in a context of 
interaction between NGDO coalitions and IGOs? 
o How can the alternative structure of NGDO coalitions be expected to affect the 
performance of NGDOs conducting IPA? 
o Does the conclusion regarding the contentious potential of NGDO coalitions 
challenge or confirm the general critique regarding the lacking contentious features 
of GCS? 
 
Assumptions 
The research question is based on a number of assumptions, which are substantiated 
throughout the thesis. First and foremost that the NGDO coalitions due to their 
qualitatively different characteristics have the potential to play a different role on the 
global stage compared to the existing TANs. Briefly put, this is based on the observations 
that coalitions require a high degree of commitment, are organised around a broader 
agenda than single-issue networks (Yanacopulos 2005:96), and have a stronger connection 
to the South. This is discussed in Chapter 3. In general, the focus on a broader agenda 
implies a more systemic approach to policy advocacy than thematic networks making 
coalitions more interesting in an analysis of their contentious features. Further the research 
question assumes that NGDOs constitute a more than insignificant part of GCS. This is 
substantiated in Chapter 2, where it is argued that NGDOs assume a dominant role on the 
global stage.  
Additionally, the discussion of the contentious features of GCS is based on two 
underlying assumptions: that the current global economic agenda predominantly is set by 
institutions promoting neoliberal values, which basically disregard social consequences; 
and that NGDOs as ‘agents of progressive social change’ (Shutt 2009:3) work to improve 
social conditions of the world’s poor people. This agenda is, in lack of a better term, 
referred to as a ‘social democratic’ agenda with reference to Katz (Katz 2006:336). I do 
not contend that these cannot be combined, but I assume that the two different objectives 
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more often than not result in a conflict of interests. In neo-Gramscian terms this implies 
that NGDOs generally should take interest in counter-hegemonic efforts. 
 
Ambiguous concepts 
In development research (and practice) certain concepts are characterised by being subject 
to a range of varying understandings and interpretations making it necessary to specify 
how these concepts are used. 
 A common predicament is how to concisely refer to the group of countries, which can 
be characterised by being less economically developed and generally located outside the 
economically leading regions of the world. With the determination to avoid the hopelessly 
anachronistic and politically loaded Third world and in lack of better alternatives, I apply the 
term the South to describe this group of countries. 
Literature also makes use of a large number of different terms in describing 
development organisations or non-governmental organisations in general. To avoid 
complicating matters unnecessarily this thesis uses four terms to differentiate between 
various types of organisations, first and foremost, the term non-governmental 
development organisation (NGDO). I use this term to cover northern-based non-
governmental organisations working with development cooperation internationally with 
headquarters in the North. Though there also are non-governmental organisations 
working with international development in the South, these are generally not included 
when applying this term.  
When it is necessary to distinguish between organisations of the North and the South 
the terms northern NGDO (NNGDO) and southern NGDO (SNGDO) are used. In this 
sense SNGDO is considered to cover the complete range of southern-based organisations 
ranging from diminutive community-based organisations to large NGDOs working 
internationally. Furthermore it has been necessary to introduce the more general 
abbreviation NGO when making references to research that not only covers development 
organisation. 
Regarding NGDO coalitions, I refer to organisations, which resemble the sort 
described in the introduction. This means coalitions that are formed to decompose the 
North-South divide, i.e. they comprise a more or less equal amount of SNGDO and 
NNGDO members. Further a formally established principle of equal influence to all 
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constituted members is essential, as it is a central assumption in the analysis. This type of 
coalition is still relatively new and therefore not widespread, which is why I focus on the 
potential of NGDO coalitions to be contentious rather than the actual contentious qualities 
of the sum of existing NGDO coalitions. 
Policy advocacy is also a term subject to different understandings and definitions. Some 
authors distinguish between advocacy, lobbying and campaigning, while others use the 
term policy advocacy to cover all of these instruments. In this thesis the latter definition is 
applied, as the focus is not on the nature of influence policy processes, but on how 
NGDO coalitions can be expected to affect policy processes in general. 
Finally it should be mentioned that the most ambiguous term of them all, global civil 
society, is discussed is presented in Chapter 2. 
 
Limits to the scope of the thesis 
While it might be evident from the thesis this far, it should be noted that the thesis does 
not discuss the organisational implications of entering into coalition. Focus lies on the 
outward effects of coalition building and not on the consequences of the individual 
organisations though this also undoubtedly would be an interesting research question to 
pursue. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Theory 
In this thesis I discuss theory on three different levels. Theory on global civil society 
provides a meta-framework in which the overall conclusion is placed and ideally to which 
the conclusions of this thesis contribute. The actual theoretical frame draws on neo-
Gramscian theory. From this school the concepts of war of position, historic bloc and 
transformismo are used to analyse the contentious potential of NGDO coalitions. These 
concepts are elaborated in Chapter 4. Finally theory on transnational advocacy networks is 
used to operationalize the concept of war of position. War of position in neo-Gramscian 
thought refers to a cultural and political struggle between blocks of different ideological 
positions and the TAN framework provides theoretical instruments that contribute to this 
analysis. Theory on TANs is elaborated in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Neo-Gramscianism as theoretical framework 
Discussing the potential contentious effects from coalition building on GCS necessitates 
reflection upon the chosen theoretical standpoint and the context in which these efforts 
are analysed. Focusing on macro-level effects I analyse the consequences of a given action, 
which likely is not realised by the individual organisation focusing on micro- or meso-level 
results, but is a result of the structure in which they operate. In this sense, the performance 
in the view of the organisation may be considered entirely satisfactory based on the 
organisation’s own criteria for success, because the criteria are based on parameters 
founded in a static structure. This focus on the larger-scale effects provides an interesting 
perspective because of the apparent oxymoronic quality of an organisation based on ‘social 
democratic’ values potentially supporting a neoliberal agenda. 
 
In this perspective the choice of a neo-Gramscian framework as theoretical foundation 
seems obvious. With an inhibit focus on political change based on a theoretical framework 
within which this political change can take place, Gramscian theory provides a solid 
foundation for discussing the structures in which these actions take place. In contrast with 
‘problem-solving’ theories in which the existing social and political structure is not 
questioned, Gramscian theory can be characterised as ‘critical theory’ insofar as it does not 
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take institutions and power relations for granted but “calls them into question by concerning itself 
with their origins and how and whether they might be in a process of changing” (Cox 1981:129). 
 In this thesis I depart from the assumption – derived from a range of authors – that at 
present global decision-making is dominated by a neoliberal agenda restraining social 
change, which is the general aim of NGDOs fighting poverty. That the dominating agenda 
is considered neoliberal implies the assumption that that fundamental social change cannot 
occur. Consequently the primary objective of NGDOs should be challenging this agenda. 
In this context Gramscian theory offers a number of theoretical instruments to analyse the 
expected outcome of efforts to induce political change. Perhaps most importantly in the 
present context, neo-Gramscian thought describes the concept of ‘co-optation’: “cooptation 
occurs if, in a system of power, the power holder intentionally extends some form of political participation to 
actors who pose a threat” (Lacy in Corntassel 2007:139). ‘Posing a threat’ in this context 
signifies that the selected actor potentially challenges existing power relations. The 
intentional inclusion by the power holder of subordinated actors thus implies an effort to 
maintain current power relations, an intention that cannot be explained by problem-
solving theory in which existing structures of power relations are not questioned. In this 
thesis I apply the concept of co-optation to analyse the interaction between NGDOs and 
IGOs in order to establish whether NGDO coalitions can be expected to create 
fundamental social change or if they conversely contribute to maintaining present power 
relations. Further, I apply the Gramscian terms historic bloc, transformismo and war of position, 
which are introduced in Chapter 4. 
 As such the nature of the analytical purpose of this thesis cannot be considered a 
critical theory approach. The focus of the thesis is not to analyse to study how structures 
influence the behaviour of NGDOs. Rather I depart from the critical theory assumption 
that existing structures should be challenged – and thereby for methodological purposes a 
fixed pattern of institutions and relations – but apply a more problems-solving oriented 
approach in how these structures can be challenged. 
 
A neo-Gramscian framework is further interesting to apply in a context where focus is on 
policy advocacy. In neo-Gramscian thought hegemony is maintained through ‘opinion-
moulding’ activities, meaning that a certain set of political ideas dominates discussions, 
political attitudes and social relations. And the objective of conducting policy advocacy is 
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precisely to alter either directly the opinion of decision-makers or to alter the public 
opinion to establish an indirect pressure on decision-makers. Neo-Gramscian thought thus 
seems as an appropriate theoretical framework to depart from. 
 
Cases 
In constructing the hypothesis proposed with the research question, I include a number of 
selected cases to both illustrate theoretical discussions and to substantiate the conclusions, 
which form the basis of the constructed hypothesis. To exemplify the characteristics of an 
NGDO coalition I use ActionAid International – which in many ways can be considered 
an archetype of the form of coalition studied in this thesis – as a model. ActionAid 
International provides an interesting case for several reasons. 
 First, AAI has as one of four explicit goals that states and their institutions “will be 
accountable and democratic and will promote, protect and fulfil human rights for all” and states that the 
organisations comprising AAI “derive legitimacy and authority to pursue our national and 
international advocacy work from [their] experience and relationship with, and from the support of, the 
people and communities [they] work with” (ActionAid 2005:5, 10f). I.e. the strategy of ActionAid 
is (among other things) to make use of policy advocacy at an international level to take 
action against ‘the causes of poverty’ representing the communities it works with. 
 Second, AAI has a structure that can be identified as a coalition. Yanacopulos defines 
an NGO coalition as an entity that generally has permanent staff members, a headquarters 
or secretariat, stronger links and wider agendas than single-issue thematic networks and 
can be considered an organisation in itself (Yanacopulos 2005:95). AAI defines itself as a 
federation understood as a ‘union comprised of self-governing Affiliates and Associates 
which are members united by a central or international structure and by shared values, 
vision and mission’. AAI has a two-tier structure with both an assembly where every 
member is represented and an international board and further an international secretariat 
(ActionAid 2010:10, 12ff). Further AAI can truly be characterised as a coalition of 
different organisations given that it is not only comprised of different branches originally 
derived from one organisation (e.g. Oxfam or CARE) but also includes organisations like 
the Danish MS ActionAid, which have not previously been related to the alliance. 
 Third, AAI builds on – in a development context – progressive notions of 
organisational democracy with guiding principles of one member per country and equality 
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among affiliates regardless of age, size, location and scale of income generation (ActionAid 
2010:10).  
In sum, AAI can be considered – with reference to Flyvbjerg (2006) – a critical case. 
Being a coalition that emphasises the inclusion of the South, generally promotes a 
democratic structure and has an integrated structure allowing for new forms of 
cooperation, AAI distinguishes itself from the vast majority of other institutionalised 
forms of cooperation among NGDOs. In the context of this thesis all of these 
characteristics are important in a context of contentions as is argued later in the thesis. 
Thus if the AAI as case does not support a hypothesis of NGDO coalitions contributing 
to the counter-hegemonic features of GCS, then NGDO coalitions in general should not be 
expected to do this. 
Conversely, if the AAI case supports a hypothesis of NGDO coalitions contributing to 
the hegemonic features of GCS, most likely the majority of other coalitions and coalition-like 
structures do this. Whichever hypothesis the AAI supports it is important to note that it 
first and foremost serves an informative purpose, meaning that it is primarily applied to 
provide a basic model to construct the hypothesis from. 
 
Further, the thesis also draws on a number of cases found in literature, where the 
interaction between development organisations and IGOs are studied. These include a 
study by Murphy (2005) of the World Bank’s approach to civil society in an education 
programme in Niger; a study by Joachim (2003) of women’s organisation’s successes with 
promoting women’s issues on the UN agenda; and a study by Corntassel (2007) of 
indigenous rights networks lack of success in promoting indigenous people’s issues in the 
UN. Further observations from the ACT Alliance are included. 
 
In the final chapter before the conclusion I discuss the validity of the constructed 
hypothesis by evaluating the included in cases in a generalisation perspective. It is 
therefore important to note that neither of these cases can be considered entirely strategic 
cases (Flyvbjerg 2006:226) and only one of them involves an NGDO coalition. Rather they 
are chosen because of their informative qualities in an area where it has not been possible 
to gather information. I therefore assess the individual features of the actors described in 
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these cases and compare them to characteristics of coalitions in order to determine validity 
of generalising from the cases to NGDO coalitions. 
 
Data collection 
Information on AAI has been collected through written documentation and an interview 
with the policy advisor of ActionAid Denmark (AAD)1. A series of documents describing 
AAI’s strategies and structure such as the constitution and a governance manual and to 
some degree documents describing the operating methods of AAI are available from the 
AAI website. These provide important background information and serves as point of 
departure for the interviews. Data on the ACT Alliance is available information found on 
the Internet. The remaining cases are, as mentioned, derived from literature. 
 
Structure of thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of GCS and presents the critique of the potential of 
organisations comprising GCS to challenge the neoliberal hegemony. This sets the general 
frame for the thesis and provides the basis for a discussion at the end of thesis of how the 
results correspond to GCS theory. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the contextual changes in the development sphere and links these to 
the rationale behind coalition building. Further it is discussed how NGDO coalitions 
differ from existing TANs. This provides the basis for the analysis conducted in the 
following chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 introduces the neo-Gramscian thought and the notions of war of position, 
historic bloc and transformismo and describes how these can be applied in the analysis. 
 
Chapter 5 analyses how the operational structure of NGDO coalitions can be expected to 
contribute to a war of position by introducing theory on transnational advocacy networks 
and drawing on observations from the NGDO coalition ActionAid International. 
 
                                                 
1 This interview has not been transcribed, but can be forwarded electronically upon request 
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Chapter 6 analyses how the organisational structure of NGDO coalitions can be expected to 
contribute to the formation of a historic bloc and whether or not this structure can be 
expected to increase resistance to co-optation. 
 
Chapter 7 sums up the conclusion from the analysis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 as a basis 
for discussion in the following chapter. 
 
Chapter 8 discusses the concluded contentious potential of NGDO coalitions in relation 
to the critique of the lacking contentious capacity of GCS. 
  14 
CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
As established in the introduction by engaging in coordinated international policy 
advocacy efforts organisations can be considered to become part of the ‘global civil 
society’. IPA is closely linked to the understanding of GCS as transnational advocacy 
networks typically are portrayed as the core elements in GCS. However, as also mentioned 
the ontology and influence of GCS is highly disputed in literature. This dispute to a certain 
degree seems to derive from two different approaches to the study of GCS; where one 
group of scholars applies a more ideal-type focus of the potential of GCS, the other 
focuses on the actual flaws in GCS at current. 
This chapter initially provides an introduction to the term, followed by a presentation 
of the critique of GCS as a space for political resistance. This critique is primarily based on 
the role of TANs and NGOs in GCS, thus establishing a frame for the discussion of 
whether the formation of NGDO coalitions can be expected to accommodate this 
critique. This discussion is conducted at the end of the thesis when the counter-hegemonic 
potential of NGDO coalitions has been analysed. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
In the effort of establishing an academic understanding of GCS as an ‘island of meaning’ 
(with reference to sociologist Zerubavel (1991)) Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor list some of 
the different connotations associated with the term. These include perceptions of GCS as: 
a counterweight to global capitalism; the growth and professionalisation of transnational 
interest groups; increased connectedness as a result of the Internet; and global solidarity 
with the poor in terms of the efforts of international NGDOs (Anheier, Glasius and 
Kaldor 2001:3). Acknowledging that GCS is a concept too contested to derive a general 
operationalisation usable in many different contexts from, Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 
provide the following purely descriptive definition:  
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“[G]lobal civil society is the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located 
between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and 
economies.” (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001:17) 
 
This definition is rather vague in its lack of political bias and serves as an obligatory 
reference to one of the key terms of this study, but does not in general – as mentioned by 
the authors – provide a methodological tool for research.  
In the description by Munck to GCS, we come a little close to an understanding of 
GCS as a space for political contention. In a historical review of the notion of GCS he 
argues that the term is closely linked to the mood of the late 1980s and early 1990s, in 
which the ‘spring of peoples’ emerged. Munck argues that the concept peaked with the 
coming down of the Berlin Wall entailing the hope that people could succeed in 
challenging the state and thus implying an inherit democratic feature of civil society and 
leading to global citizenship – inspired by Antonio Gramsci (Munck 2010:318). 
 He describes GCS as a terrain understood in complex spatial, political, social and 
cultural terms. Departing from this understanding he argues that GCS is ‘a site for political 
intervention’ – and thereby not a static notion – which must be conceived of as an area 
under continual construction influenced by social and political interests. In consequence 
of this Munck proposes to abandon the apolitical perception of GCS as advanced by many 
GCS theorists and instead consider GCS as inherently political and study the relationships 
between GCS and the market and the state. Viewing GCS as a political project Munck 
argues that it is ‘neither wholly progressive nor wholly reactionary’ (Munck 2010:322). 
 
Understanding GCS as progressive Mundy and Murphy argue that has the potential to 
influence decision-making processes in two ways: by enhancing political responsiveness 
through the representation of the interests of the public in organised nongovernmental 
structures; and by safeguarding the public through limitation of governmental institutions 
ability to ‘impose arbitrary rule of force’ (Mundy and Murphy 2001:92). 
 In general they find that scholars emphasising the progressive potential of GCS 
generally depart from two theoretical traditions. One is the liberal tradition in which civil 
society is considered both as a ‘check on the excesses of the state and governmental 
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bureaucracy’ and as an arena for consensus building through which a pluralist, 
representative democracy can function. The other tradition – from which the thesis has its 
focus – is the Gramscian and other critical traditions, which focus on the potential for 
contention through civil society (Mundy and Murphy 2001:91f). 
 However, as this thesis focuses on whether the different structure of NGDO coalitions 
can be expected to provide an alternative contribution to the contentious features of GCS, 
it is necessary to present in which areas the existing organisations comprising GCS fail. As 
Munck puts it: “If the INGOs which flourished in the 1990s are seen as the backbone of global civil 
society then we must also consider the growing critique of them as agents of social transformation” (Munck 
2002:321). 
 
THE CRITIQUE OF GCS AS SPACE FOR POLITICAL CONTENTION 
On a general level, Pasha and Blaney offer a critical view on the theoretical foundation on 
which the advocates of GCS as a progressive force is based. They argue that the 
perception of GCS as providing possibilities of accountability in global governance, 
through recent trends of activism of social movements and interest groups, does not move 
the conception of global democracy beyond the liberal frame. And that the present 
discourse on GCS takes the unequal relationships of global capitalism for granted as the 
infrastructure of through which GCS can develop. Pasha and Blaney further argue that 
while this understanding of GCS might have the potential to challenge the current global 
political economic relations, it represents another hegemonic vision, as this understanding 
of GCS equals promoting the “global” values North American and European activists 
(Pasha and Blaney 1998:418f). 
 
Concretising the critique of GCS, Chandhoke provides a comprehensive critique of GCS 
and in particular of international NGOs as actors on the global stage is Chandhoke. She 
initiates her critique of GCS by questioning the very premises of a large group of 
researchers within GCS, namely that GCS comprises a ‘third sector’ independent from and 
an alternative to the state-centric international order and networks of global markets. And 
encourages to separating the normative expectations of GCS from studying the actual nature 
of GCS (Chandhoke 2002:37).  
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Rather she argues that civil society – opposite authors optimistic towards the potential 
of GCS –is subject to the same mechanics as the spheres of the state and the market, and 
thus might reflect the power constellations of existing structures. And further that GCS in 
many cases depend on either governmental or market based institutions, which generally 
obstructs GCS from providing a radically different and economically just global system 
(Chandhoke 2002:37).  
On the contrary, Chandhoke notes that the organisations comprising GCS prefer to 
operate within the established global system. She argues that some of the large 
international NGOs – for instance by engaging in the decision-making processes of the 
World Bank and IMF – support and thereby legitimise the post-Washington Consensus 
agenda. In other words, by cooperating with and accepting the terms of the agenda-setting 
institutions of the World Bank and IMF, GCS provide the fundamentally political 
prioritisations with an “apolitical notion of governance” – instead of struggling for an alternative 
and more just system (Chandhoke 2002:37ff). 
Central in this perception of GCS is her conception of the post-Washington 
Consensus. According to Chandhoke the shift in politics from what has been termed the 
Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus was based on three beliefs: 
 
“First, globalisation was too important to be left to the unrestricted corporate world and should be mediated 
through ‘governance’ that ensured transparency, accountability, capacity building, and safety networks. Second, 
the state needed to be replaced not so much by the market as by civil society organisations that represented the 
aspirations of the people and that strengthened democracy. This of course meant that the fields of the market and 
of non-market transactions were, in policy prescriptions, separated. Third, the new consensus opined that only a 
strong civil society under the guidance of NGOs can further democracy.” (Chandhoke 2002:45) 
 
However, Chandhoke argues that aside from rhetorical changes, the post-Washington 
Consensus agenda has not diverted much from its previous course as notions of a free 
market and a minimal state still play a key role, now in the development of a strong civil 
society. In this perspective GCS thus plays a pivotal, though not necessarily positive, role 
in the present global economic system. 
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THE ROLE OF NGOS IN GCS 
Considering the composition of GCS, Chandhoke reflects on the dominant presence of 
NGOs in comparison to other GCS actors such as labour unions, political activists, anti-
globalisation movements etc., which earlier assumed an essential role in GCS. Chandhoke 
points to the agenda-setting successes of NGOs – beginning with the UNCED in Rio 
1992 – throughout the 1990s as the main driver for NGOs becoming to dominate the 
stage of GCS as powerful and influential actors even vis-à-vis states. And she argues that 
two contextual parameters made this development possible. 
 First, the ‘informational revolution’ has enabled NGOs to collect, produce, exchange, 
and disseminate information on specialised issues making NGOs superior even to 
governments, which do not dispose of the same amount of resources to assemble 
information and mobilise public opinion on a global level. Second, NGOs are considered 
to possess what Chandhoke term “the hallmark of ethical political intervention”, i.e. moral 
authority and legitimacy, which stems from the claim that NGOs represent and promote 
general public interests (Chandhoke 2002:40f).  
However, Chandhoke questions this ethical hallmark on the grounds that international 
NGOs often cannot be characterised as civil society organisations (CSO), and therefore 
not automatically possess this hallmark. She asserts that a CSO ideally is an organisation 
that enables individuals to realise their selfhood through collective action in groups of 
which membership is voluntary and revocable. And further that these groups recognise 
the individual, as the primary actor in civil society, while the group or organisation is only 
a secondary actor enabling the individual. In this perspective, she finds that international 
NGOs rarely are rooted in the societies for which they claim to work and more often than 
not come with a predetermined set of values or even programmes, and on these grounds 
questions the representativeness of the NGOs (Chandhoke 2002:46). 
Chandhoke further contends that the international NGOs’ lack of representativeness 
might even have negative consequences as they often operate in a bureaucratised system 
with highly specialised lingua and have inherit ideas of what can and cannot be politically 
accepted, which in the end risks disempowering and excluding the people, which they 
claim to represent (Chandhoke 2002:46f). 
Another point of critique raised by other authors regard the motives of the 
international NGOs. In a study of human rights organisations Brewington, Davis and 
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Murdie find that international human rights organisations are driven by material concerns 
rather than values, opposed to the dominant theoretical framework of international NGOs 
(Brewington, Davis and Murdie 2009:3). 
 
Having presented the most important points in the critique of GCS and of NGOs as the 
primary actors within, we now proceed to consider on which points NGDO coalitions 
differ from the organisations addressed by this critique. 
  20 
CHAPTER 3: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NGDOS COALITIONS 
 
Establishing what characterises NGDO coalitions, it is necessary to review the rationale 
behind coalition building. As indicated in the introduction, the formation of NGDO 
coalitions can to a large extent be interpreted as a response to the pressure on NGDOs to 
innovate. Obviously, coalition building can also be explained as the expected development 
of a group of organisations that during half a century has matured and grown and that the 
natural next development step is the formation of coalitions. However, in this chapter I 
present the changing context in which NGDOs operate and – departing from NGO 
literature – argue how this context shapes the characteristics of NGDO coalitions. 
 
Hailey suggests four categories of drivers for NGDOs to form international structures: 
contextual drivers, which include changes in the development architecture; strategic drivers, 
which addresses the suboptimal structure of many NGDOs in responding to a changing 
development environment; external criticism, which addresses questioning of the 
effectiveness and accountability of NGDOs; and institutional, managerial and technological 
drivers, which include expectations of benefits from economies of scale and the 
development in information technology (Hailey 2009:2f). 
A reading of Yanacopulos indirectly supports the assertion of strategic drivers, external 
criticism and institutional, managerial and technological drivers as factors accelerating the 
formation of international NGDO structures. Drawing on the resource dependency perspective 
(RDP) – rooted in organizational studies and developed by Pfeffer and Salancik – 
Yanacopulos argues that coalition building with the objective of engaging in policy 
advocacy can be seen as a result of NGDOs’ dependency on available resources. In RDP 
‘resources’ can be interpreted as anything the organisations depend on, but Yanacopulos 
asserts that non-profit organisations particularly rely on three resources, namely funds, 
information and knowledge and legitimacy (Yanacopulos 2005:97).  
In the following sections I present the main characteristics of the primary drivers and 
apply the RDP to these. In this way dependency on legitimacy explains external criticism as a 
driver, dependency on funds explains the strategic drivers, and dependency on information 
and knowledge explains the institutional, managerial and technological drivers.  
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But first follows an initial review of the contextual challenges, which constitute the 
background of the pressure to change.  
 
CONTEXTUAL DRIVERS – CHALLENGES THAT NECESSITATE CHANGE. 
Both literature and the NGDOs acknowledge that the structure and operational methods 
of NGDOs are challenged by a significant number of factors. During the autumn of 2009 
the Danish NGO network Thematic Forum arranged a series of seminars addressing the 
issue of challenges faced by the NGDOs. Some of the key challenges emphasised in this 
seminar were bureaucratic demands from donors, political demands derived from the Paris 
Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action, legitimacy and accountability issues, and the 
internal challenges regarding democracy and power balance in the international and global 
NGO-partnerships (Jensen 2010:4f).  
In another consultation of NGDOs, a series of discussions with staff from eight 
international organisations facilitated by Institute of Development Studies at the 
University of Sussex Brighton (IDS) emphasised challenges including: diminishing political 
space for transformative work, the dominating role of large international corporations on 
the global arena, the impacts of the war on terror and democracy crisis and declining trust 
in public institutions (Shutt 2009:7). Lewis (1998) and Edwards, Hulme and Wallace 
(1999) add to the challenges listing globalisation and the strengthened capacity of NGOs 
in the South, which have entailed that funds are increasingly being directed directly to 
NGOs in the South (Lewis 1998; Edwards, Hulme and Wallace 1999).  
The change in the direction of donor funds to NGDO, which might be considered the 
greatest challenge to northern-based NGDOs, is indicated in a review of SIDA funding of 
NGOs. It demonstrates that SIDA in Bangladesh increasingly has funded SNGDOs 
directly through the SIDA Dhaka office and support the trend that SNGDOs in 
Bangladesh assume positions in the Bangladeshi development sector alongside 
international NNGDOs (Lewis and Sobhan 1999:117f). Some find that is a threat to 
NGDO partnerships between North and South, while others perceive it as the logical 
result of larger and more capable SNGDOs, though it increases governmental spending 
on administrative costs (Smillie 1993:184f). 
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In sum, the list of challenges facing NGDOs that work internationally is significant 
with particular emphasis on the stronger and more economically self-sufficient SNGDOs, 
which slowly obviates the previous role of NNGDOs as capacity-builders and mediators 
of funds. 
 
EXTERNAL CRITICISM AS A DRIVER 
Historically the perceived importance of NGDOs as development actors has been 
characterised by substantial change related to the position of NGDOs in the development 
sphere. After World War II and throughout the 1960s organisations, which were later to 
be NGDOs, were primarily conducting relief work and were associated with this line of 
work. During the 1970s and 1980s foreign aid was one component of several in an 
international game of geopolitical influence and emphasis was on state-led development 
approaches. In this period NGDOs were not considered important development actors in 
official development strategies. Some even considered them only little more than 
inexpensive delivery mechanisms (Fowler 1998:137; Lewis 1998:501f; Smillie 1993:162f). 
 The initial political interest for NGDOs as agents of change originated in the 1980s as a 
response to the perceived failure of state-led development initiatives. NGDOs were 
considered to be efficient and cost-effective institutions in the effort of conducting sound 
development activities under the ‘new policy agenda’2 of the 1990s with the inherit focus 
on good governance and democratic institutions of the NGDOs (Lewis 1998:501f). The 
1990s saw an exponential increase in NGDOs, which took on a range of new functions 
and created formal and informal networks with all kinds of official institutions and on 
various levels, and began attracting interest on an international level. NGDOs were 
idealized as organisations doing good, derived from the ‘non-state’ and ‘non-profit’ features 
of NGDOs as actors, of which ‘nothing short of miracles’ was expected. NGDOs 
received substantial attention from official development agencies and were to some extent 
perceived to be the panacea for previous shortcomings of the interventionist, top-down 
                                                 
2 ’The new policy agenda’ as (critically) termed by Fowler: ”Under the label of good governance, political pressure is now 
part of the aid landscape, putting pressure on countries of the South and East to introduce multi-party politics, slim down their 
bureaucracies, be more transparent and accountable, respect human rights, advance women’s position in society, create greater space for 
civic action and reduce military expenditure” (Fowler 1998:138) 
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development practice of bilateral development cooperation. (Fisher 1997:440ff; Srinivas 
2009:614f) 
 But now it seems as the importance of northern-based NGDOs in development 
policies has peaked as the picture of them as centrally placed actors is gradually changing. 
NGDOs still play a key role in the development practice, but the influence of NNGDOs 
is slowly being moderated as indicated by the growing amount of donor funds being 
channelled directly to the South. 
 
Also in academia the perception of NGDOs has changed. Throughout the 1990s scholarly 
focus was primarily on the features, roles, work orientations and spheres of work of the 
NGOs and NGDOs were emphasised as an alternative to the existing development 
agenda. Some scholars, however, underlined the risk for NGDOs to become “’technical 
solutions’ to development ‘problems’” and contribute to the justification of development practice 
as apolitical. (Fisher 1997:440ff; Srinivas 2009:614f) 
But by the end of the 1990s focus shifted towards the strategies and developmental 
impact of the NGDOs, and a more critical view on NGDOs began to dominate NGDO 
literature (Srinivas 2009:615). Questions were raised about the equity of NGDO-
partnerships between NNGDOs and SNGDOs, both the overly or lack of 
professionalization of the northern-based organisations, about the delivery-oriented 
approach of the NNGDOs, about the dependency of state-funds and particularly about 
the lack of connection to the people, which the NGDOs claimed to represent (Fowler 
1998; Srinivas 2009; Edwards, Hulme and Wallace 1999; Edwards and Hulme 1996; 
Chandhoke 2002). 
 
In RDP terms, the NGDOs’ legitimacy as resource both within the political and academic 
sphere is diminishing. In this perspective coalition building can be interpreted as an 
attempt to regain legitimacy. Forming or joining coalitions in which southern-based 
organisations are also represented sends a signal of reconnecting with the target groups. 
Collaborating with SNGDOs with a solid connection to the grassroots contribute in 
justifying the NGDO claim of speaking on behalf of the poor. In this sense a coalition 
serves as a bridging function transporting the voices of the poor via influential northern-
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based organisations to decision-makers on a global level and arguably yield legitimacy to 
the NNGDOs (Yanacopulos 2005:101). 
In relation to this it is worth mentioning that legitimacy gain is not necessarily a one-
way gain: from a SNGDOs’ point of view entering a coalition with established NNGDOs 
can also provide legitimacy in the growing competition of donor funds that are flowing 
directly to organisations in South (Yanacopulos 2005:101). 
 
STRATEGIC DRIVERS 
Applying the RDP to the strategic drivers argument, coalition building can be seen as a 
reflection of shifting political priorities. The perhaps most noticeable political change in 
approaches to NGDO support has been the evolution in the emphasis of the term 
‘partnership’ in political strategies. Initially the emphasis on partnership between 
NNGDOs and SNGDOs originated in the 1970s as an NGDO ideological belief that 
international solidarity should be expressed through an equal partnership between 
organisations in the North and South (Fowler 1998:140). Then gradually partnership as a 
term received increased political attention internationally and ultimately assuming a pivotal 
role in the NGDO strategy formulation through the 1990s and the 2000s culminating with 
the emphasis on partner alignment and harmonisation of the Paris Declaration and AAA.  
For instance, in a Danish context this has been apparent by the political priority of 
NGDO partnerships between North and South, which in the 1990s came to play a 
fundamental role in Danish development strategies. While there did not even exist an 
overall strategy for the Danish support to NGDOs did before 1993, the general Danish 
strategy for development cooperation of 2000 was called ‘Partnership 2000’ with a strategy 
specific for supporting NGDOs stating that “[t]he basic premise of Partnership 2000 – the 
strategy for Danish development cooperation – is that realistic forms of partnership can and must be 
established. (…) Partnership can encompass dialogue as well as support to capacity building and contribute 
to specific activities.” (Danida 2000:33). 
 
The political prioritisation of partnership has been reflected in the operational methods of 
NGDOs. Until the 1980s NNGDOs commonly assumed an implementing role by 
running activities and being the main facilitator in achieving a given project’s goals 
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drawing on significant numbers of expatriate staff (Lewis 1998:503f). Through the 1980s 
and beginning of the 1990s, partnerships between NNGOs and SNGOs evolved with 
South-organisations taking over the implementing part and the North-organisations 
assuming a supporting role and being increasingly less involved in implementing activities 
(Smillie 1993:184). In the attempt to escape a donor-recipient relationship NNGDOs 
sought to redefine partnerships through ‘capacity-building’ (Lewis 1998:504). 
The widespread emphasis of partnership as a key element in NGDO performance has 
resulted in a broad interpretation of the term among NGDOs. This has lead to the 
contention of some scholars that the meaning of the term has been eroded and that the 
amount of meaningful and mutual partnerships, which can live up to the original notion is 
very limited. Various explanations are given to the inequality that often characterises 
North-South relationships. Fowler argues that the lack of ‘authentic’ NGDO-partnerships 
is due to the hitherto inability of NGDOs to establish a relational balance and mutually 
empowering relationships between North and South (Fowler 1998:140f). 
 
But the watered down interpretation of partnership has to be seen in conjunction with the 
political prioritisation. Making equal partnerships with SNGDOs mandatory in the 
support to NNGDOs evidently produces a broad understanding of the term. The 
tendency to form international coalitions can thus be interpreted as a reaction to the 
emphasis on partnership. With an unabated focus on partnerships with South 
organisations and SNGDOs becoming more capable and to a decreasing extent demand 
capacity building, coalition building can be perceived as a form of organisation that 
redefines the partnership structure without leaving the NNGDOs redundant. As Hailey 
argues NGDOs are shifting their strategic role away from operational development actors 
to role where they assist the development work of SNGDOs (Hailey 2009:2). 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DRIVERS 
The technological and institutional development as driver cannot in the same way as 
strategic drivers and externalism criticism be seen as a driver that necessitates changes. 
Rather it is a driver that offers new opportunities in the NGDO work and can therefore be 
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considered a driver, which incites structural innovation rather than compelling the same; 
especially for coalitions with the objective of engaging in IPA.  
Information as a resource is one of the key dependencies of organisations engaged in 
advocacy as the amount and quality of information is closely linked to the influence of 
advocacy work. Information sharing and specialization of skills can greatly contribute to 
this resource by increasing diversity and cost sharing and hence coalition building – with 
the entailing pooling of resources – is a method of obtaining these advantages. To this end 
the development in information and communication technology has greatly increased the 
possibilities and ways of information sharing and thus plays a central role in the formation 
of coalitions by easing collaboration through coordination. The availability of cheap and 
regular transportation in the form of air travel also contributes to enabling transnational 
cooperation (Yanacopulos 2005:101ff; Hailey 2009:3). 
 In an information perspective, forming coalitions is not only related to increasing 
information as a resource but also to reducing funds as a resource in relation to 
information. Advocacy on a global level is extremely expensive and in some cases not 
feasible for even the largest NGOs. Research is also expensive and by having individual 
coalition members specialize in specific issues the other members benefit from high-
quality research allowing the coalition greater influence. This is particularly important as 
the competition for funds becomes more outspoken (Yanacopulos 2005:101ff). Further, 
coming together in a coalition is a way of reaching widely dispersed policy forums in a 
both more effective and less cost-extensive manner (Mably 2006:19). 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR COALITION BUILDING 
Encapsulating the chapter this far, it can be stated that NGDOs of the North are under 
pressure due to changing political priorities and a transforming global arena and due to 
greater demands of the NGDOs from donors, partners and the public in terms of 
efficiency and accountability. By applying a resource dependency perspective coalition 
building can, in part, be interpreted as a method for NGDOs to decrease expenditure of 
the ‘resources’ they depend on, namely funds and legitimacy, through inclusion of South-
based organisations, information sharing, specialisation of skills and pooling of resources. 
And thereby adapt to the present challenges by increasing the overall availability of these 
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resources. And further it has been argued that coalition building increases a third resource, 
information. As it appears from the following chapter, these three resources are all 
essential when conducting IPA. In sum, NGDOs, by forming coalitions in order to 
accommodate with external challenges, increase their IPA capacity. 
 
On an overall level coalition building can be seen as an attempt to address global and 
systemic issues by coming together and thereby establishing a stronger voice in challenging 
the influence of dominating actors. Or as the framework of RDP prescribes, in a condition 
where significant power asymmetries exist peripheral actors will unite and challenge the 
present power hierarchy (Yanacopulos 2005:100). Hence, the formation of coalitions 
among NGDOs, if policy advocacy is an explicit objective, can be interpreted as an 
attempt to influence or challenge the current international development agenda. But how 
can NGDO coalitions then be distinguished from existing transnational advocacy 
networks? 
 
COMPARING NGDO COALITIONS TO TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY 
NETWORKS 
The term transnational advocacy network is developed by Keck and Sikkink and covers a 
broad range of different interest networks including networks of firms, scientists, activists 
etc. (Keck and Sikkink 1999:89). As such NGDO coalitions can be considered to fit within 
this definition. However, considering how TANs are defined by Keck and Sikkink I argue 
below that NGDO coalitions distinguish themselves from the general definition of TANs 
in a number of ways. Keck and Sikkink apply a very broad definition of TANs to both 
include networks as actors per se, but also networks as a political space in which ‘differently 
situated actors negotiate’ (Keck and Sikkink 1999:90f). In their framework, however, they 
primarily refer to TANs as actors, which is also the understanding I refer to when 
describing TANs as this provides a more suitable basis for comparison with coalitions. 
 Describing TANs Keck and Sikkink characterise TANs as ‘communicative structures’ 
defined as networks of actors “working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared 
values, a common discourse, and dense exchange of information”. They highlight the resemblance 
between their understanding of TANs and domestic social movements and they 
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emphasise the role of exchange of information. And argue that networks are characterised 
by ‘voluntary, reciprocal and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange’ with 
information change at the core of the relationship. And further argue that TANs are ‘most 
prevalent in issues areas characterized by high value content and informational uncertainty’ 
and mention ‘human rights, the environment, women, infant health, and indigenous 
people’ as causes typically promoted by TANs (Keck and Sikkink 1999:89ff). 
 
The IPA objective 
NGDO coalitions differ from TANs in most of the above-mentioned points. First of all, 
the overall objective for NGDOs to engage in IPA is to a certain degree different than 
those TANs. Where TANs are typically organised around single or thematic issues 
(Yanacopulos 2005:94), the IPA objective of NGDOs tend to focus on more structural 
issues. Although most NGDOs have their core competences within health, education, 
women’s rights etc., the overall objective can crudely put be defined as efforts to reduce 
poverty through economic and social development.  
Causes of poverty are per se very complex issues, which to a large extent can be 
explained as rooted in the international power relations, and thus engaging in IPA with an 
objective of reducing poverty necessitates a more systemic approach to IPA by addressing 
structural issues. Looking at AAI for instance, on their website they state that they “act 
against poverty on all fronts, local to international” by doing “Advocacy and Campaigns for; […] the 
reversal of unfair trade rules and practices imposed by International Financial Institutions and seek to 
embed pro-poor development at the centre of the multilateral trading system” and campaigns that 
“promote food security for people and food sovereignty for the nation, Trade Justice, pro-poor aids policy 
and the realisation of the millennium declaration of the United Nations” (actionaid.org). To address 
the issues of particularly trade and food security requires that historically well-founded 
economic structures are questioned and challenged.  
To clarify, I do not wish to contend that the approach of NGDO coalitions is entirely 
different from the objectives of existing TANs and that TANs in general only apply a very 
narrow focus to promote single issues without regard to structural causes. But I assert that 
the formation of NGDO coalitions advance a tendency of more systemic approaches to 
IPA. 
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The structure of NGDO coalitions 
Another feature that distinguishes NGDO coalitions from TANs is the profile of 
coalitions, which cannot be defined as merely communicative structures. Where TANs in 
the definition of Keck and Sikkink have been created and exist to advocate policy change, 
engaging in policy processes is only part of – and in many cases still not significant part of 
– the objectives of NGDO coalitions. As described above, NGDOs have a long history of 
administering development projects – first as the implementing part and later through 
more coordinating efforts – and these projects still represent a major share in the strategies 
of most NGDOs’ efforts to reduce poverty and can be considered to constitute the 
backbone of the collaboration in NGDO coalitions.  
And this must be assumed to influence the structure of coalitions. Facilitating 
development projects across different regions of the world necessitates a much more 
coordinated collaboration as the implementation of such projects is a longer, more 
complex and much more cost-extensive process than engaging in policy processes. This 
means that the structure of coalitions needs to be more integrated regarding channels of 
communication and funds and requires formally constituted forums for coordinating 
efforts. As already described in the previous chapter, this is the case in AAI, which has a 
central international structure with an assembly and an international board and secretariat; 
features that the typical TAN do not have. 
 The more integrated structure of coalitions also – as argued above – allow for a pooling 
of resources and a division of labour, which makes specialisation within for instance areas 
of research possible. Hence, coalitions can be expected to possess comparative advantages 
regarding the production of specialised research. 
 
Further, and as already touched upon, a key difference between coalitions and existing 
IPA structures is the ties to organisations in South. A survey of Northern NGOs advocacy 
efforts conducted by Anderson demonstrated that only 2 out of 23 NGOs indicated to 
have consulted Southern NGOs in selecting topics for their advocacy. And only 14 out of 
23 reported to be members of alliances with Southern organisations (Anderson 
2000:447ff). 
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Conversely, the structure of coalitions – with an explicit focus on including the South 
as defined in this thesis – allows a different approach in IPA. Taking AAI as example, the 
constitution of AAI states that all affiliate members are equal whatever size, age, location 
and most importantly generation of income (ActionAid 2009:5). I.e. the affiliate members 
in e.g. Ghana, Uganda and Malawi have the same right to influence as the affiliate 
members in the UK, Denmark and Netherlands. In theory this entails a forum where the 
organisations of the South have better conditions for representing their constituencies vis-
à-vis the policy targets of the coalition, as compared to an advocacy network where the 
interests of the South is typically advocated by northern-based organisations. 
Reviewing the distribution of members by country of two of the largest coalitions, the 
ACT Alliance and AAI, the structure of these coalitions also break with the pattern of an 
overrepresentation of NNGDOs in existing networks. Merely considering the 
headquarters of the member organisations, a count shows that in the ACT Alliance only 
30% of the member organisations (34 of 113) are based in the North (actalliance.org), 
while for AAI it is 27% of the member organisations (10 of 37) that are based in the 
North (actionaid.org). Other things being equal, this means that coalitions such as AAI 
and ACT Alliance are better predisposed to claim advocating the interests of the poor than 
TANs, in which the share of South-members is typically low. And in the end provides a 
more legitimate basis for advocacy work where the main objective is promoting the 
interests of the poor.  
Additionally coalitions with a regionally more diverse representation of members must 
be assumed to possess a greater amount of information regarding the developing regions 
of the world. 
 
The shortcomings of TANs 
Other factors where NGDOs can be expected to be different from TANs regard the 
inadequacies of TANs. According to Jordan and van Tuijl (2000) TANs present a list of 
shortcomings in relation to policy advocacy. First of all, they remain critical towards the 
definition of networks as actors ‘working internationally on an issue, who are bound 
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchange of information’ 
provided by Keck and Sikkink, arguing that there is no empirical evidence for such a 
generalisation. Conversely, they assert that in NGO networks ‘common elements are often 
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only partly shared’, that information may be ‘irregular and unbalanced’ and that ‘mutually 
recognized rules in a campaign are far from common’. They further argue that the majority 
of NGOs initiate campaigns with a campaign concern and ‘not by determining shared 
values among the network-participants’ and that the ‘ideal form of cooperation in 
transnational advocacy (…) is the exception rather than the rule’ (Jordan and van Tuijl 
2000:2062). 
 Jordan and van Tuijl contend that the lack of successful advocacy networks can be 
explained by the extreme difficulty for an organisation to conduct advocacy outside its 
own political area. They find that this difficulty is due to three main causes. First, people 
and NGOs primarily – because legitimacy, language and culture – respond to incentives 
emerging in their own political space and not on planetary risks. Second, that it is not 
feasible to maintain too many relations with actors within other political arenas or sectors, 
as managing relationships requires resources and is very hard to implement effectively, and 
this limits the ability of organisations to overcome their specialisation in selected areas. 
Further, that engaging in networks involves a risk of getting entangled in conflicting 
allegiances (e.g. between donors and local partner organisations), which can compel 
organisations to prioritise in ways that compromise the relationship to some partners. 
Third, by engaging in international advocacy an organisation risks losing touch with its 
political constituency, which in the worst case means losing legitimacy (Jordan and van 
Tuijl 2000:2062f). Substantiating this argument Nelson, in a study of the actual impact of 
NGO advocacy on World Bank and IMF policies, concludes that in advocacy campaigns it 
is important that an agreed, shared agenda is adhered to and that international advocates 
are explicit in stating for whom they speak in order to prevent internal disagreements in 
the campaign (Nelson 2000:488). 
 Considering NGDO coalitions in this perspective, they have a potential to avoid many 
of these pitfalls. In a coalition with a structure such as AAI – that has an actual 
constitution and a governance manual – mutually recognized rules are per se common, 
organisations are to a certain degree legally obligated to ‘share common elements’ and 
channels of communications are well founded. Further the advocacy practice of AAI, 
where each member organisation focuses advocacy work at own political arenas, helps 
preventing the loss of legitimacy from operating outside the organisations’ constituencies 
and generally allows for organisations to act within their core competences. And finally a 
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coalition as an organisation in itself is much better suited to speak with one voice vis-à-vis 
other actors and thereby simplifying matters of external relations. 
 
The dependence on governmental funding 
One final distinction between coalitions and TANs that needs to be mentioned regards 
funding. Where traditional advocacy-oriented organisations such Greenpeace and 
Amnesty International have an explicit policy of denying funds provided by governments 
(sourcewatch.org), NGDOs have a history of administering and mediating official donor 
funds for development purposes and would arguably in many cases not be able to exist 
without governmental support. This inevitably raises suspicion regarding whether the 
NGDO dependence on governmental funds influences prioritisations regarding engaging 
in policy advocacy. However, the survey conducted by Anderson indicates that 
dependence on governmental funds does not affect the share of the total funds spent on 
policy advocacy; in fact some cases contradicted this hypothesis (Anderson 2000:447). 
Obviously this survey is not conclusive and further somewhat old, so it can by no 
means be ruled out that there in some cases exists a correlation. Neither does the share of 
funds spent on policy advocacy indicate anything regarding the substance of the policy 
advocacy, so self-censorship might very well exist. But it could also be argued that if funds 
for advocacy is pooled, as they for instance in a coalition, it is very hard for donors to 
track how funds are used thereby limiting their means to criticise the spending of funds 
making coalitions more resistant to donor pressure. However, as it is not possible to 
conclusively state anything regarding the dependence on governmental funds, this issue is 
disregarded in the present thesis. 
 
Summing up, it can be concluded that NGDO coalitions possess qualitatively different 
features than existing TANs. These features are derived from both a different operational 
structure, which provides for division of labour, pooling of resources, specialisation and 
more integrated coordinating facilities. And from a different organisational structure through 
the improved inclusion of the South, which increases legitimacy in an IPA context and 
provides alternative channels of information. Additionally, the IPA approach of NGDO 
coalitions in general can be considered to be more systemic. This might provide a 
difference in a neo-Gramscian framework as it is argued in the analysis. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONTENTION IN NEO-GRAMSCIANISM THOUGHT 
 
THE NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVE ON HEGEMONY 
Robert Cox originally developed the neo-Gramscian perspective on hegemony in the 
1980s, when he broke with conventional IR theory and broadened the understanding of 
hegemony to include a wider range of dimensions than the traditional economic and 
military factors. In this understanding hegemony is maintained through ‘opinion-moulding 
activity’ rather than brute force, which permeates structures of society, economy, class, 
ideology etc. (Bieler and Morton 2004:86f). Hegemony may prevail “based on a coherent 
conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order 
(including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of 
universality” (Cox 1981:139). I.e. a hegemonic position of ideology exists when a given set 
of political ideas dominate and permeate discussions and debates, political attitudes and 
social relations. One of the three atmospheres of activities, on which hegemony is 
constituted according to Cox, is the ‘social relations of production’. In this context 
production is understood in the broadest sense, including the production and 
reproduction of knowledge and the social relations, morals and institutions related to the 
production of goods (Bieler and Morton 2004:89). This is necessary to emphasise when 
Gramscian thought is applied in context of the global arena as is discusses below. 
The foundation of hegemony is an organisation of compliance based on coercion and 
consent. In the state-civil society relationship of the original Gramscian thought the state 
co-opts civil society to become part of an extended state by transformismo – an integration 
and thereby dismantling of potentially dangerous ideas by tolerating a limited degree of 
self-expression – which entails a pacification of civil society and a suppression of 
revolutionary thought and action (Katz 2006:335).  
The neo-Gramscian thought extends the understanding of civil society to also include 
GCS and the co-opting forces to also include international governmental organisations 
(e.g. the World Bank or the WTO) and supranational institutions like the EU, making the 
neo-Gramscian framework applicable in a theoretic discussion of GCS. Authors such as 
Katz have done just this. In this perspective the dispute over the democratic nature of 
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GCS – as presented in the previous chapter – can be framed as a discussion of how GCS 
is co-opted by hegemonic elites and at the same time provides a structure for a counter-
hegemonic bloc. 
 
GRAMSCIAN DIALECTICS AND HISTORIC BLOCS 
In Gramscian thought civil society plays a dialectical role as a political space in which both 
the existing hegemonic order is maintained but also as the space in which counter-
hegemonic forces can sprout and thrive. It is in civil society – which Gramsci defines as 
non-coercive institutions located between the market and the state and including such 
different organisations as trade unions, educational and cultural associations, churches, 
schools etc. – that an alternative social order can materialise (Katz 2006:334f). 
 For social change to happen an alternative historic bloc that can challenge the existing 
historic bloc needs to form. The term, historic bloc, refers to the organisation applied by 
leading social forces to form relationships with contending social forces. Thus, it should 
not be understood as merely a political alliance between social forces of for instance the 
same class, but rather as an integrated alliance encompassing differing class interests, 
where all involved stakeholders concur both to the same political and economic values but 
also intellectual and moral ideas (Bieler and Morton 2004:90). 
Katz argues that present global institutions and governments promoting a neoliberal 
agenda have become hegemonic in their influence on the development of the global 
society and the international relations within. And contends that the US along with other 
prominent states, inter-state actors (the EU), and non-state actors (the WTO, the World 
Bank and IMF) through a hegemonic dominance of neoliberal ideas and values constitute 
a historic bloc. He admits that the neoliberal agenda evidently have positive features such 
as a pressure for transparency and accountability in governments, technological 
advancement, exchange of ideas and thereby human interaction and economic growth. But 
that the neoliberal globalisation agenda and the inherit mechanisms become ‘regressive’ in 
their disregard of social consequences, when economic growth becomes the goal above all 
else (Katz 2006:333ff). 
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In relation to the co-optation of GCS, Katz argues – referring to a study by Carroll and 
Carson 2003 – that this bloc co-opts major international NGOs to promote the neoliberal 
agenda, among these the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (Katz 2006:335). Other authors support this view. 
One of the more controversial is Petras who asserts that NGOs have since the 1980s been 
co-opted by the World Bank and other institutions promoting neoliberal thought as there 
existed a convergence between these and the NGOs in their opposition to the state “to 
undermine the national welfare state by providing social service to compensate the victims of multinational 
corporation” (Petras 1997:11). Petras’ arguments are rather radical (and not necessarily 
substantiated in every case), but interesting in the perspective of the role of NGDO 
coalitions in GCS. 
 Less shrill but also somewhat politically flavoured, Murphy argues that the World Bank 
and international NGOs share a common agenda of internationalisation and collaborate 
on a variety of levels to achieve this. He refers to the interest of the World Bank in 
international NGOs – traditionally marginalized or excluded in elitist theory – as a way to 
extend its influence sphere and the positive response of even radical civil society theorists. 
And argues that the NGOs risk providing a ‘pseudo-democratic cover’ for the World 
Bank agenda of introducing ‘a global managerial order on the citizens of development 
countries’ (Murphy 2005:354, 370).  
 
GCS AND COUNTERHEGEMONIC FORCES 
Turning to the counter-hegemonic features of GCS neo-Gramscianism suggests that for 
the hegemony of for instance neoliberalism to be opposed, a global counter-hegemonic 
‘historic bloc’ must be formed. In a context where institutions and states promoting a 
neoliberal agenda possess a hegemonic position, Katz contends that the opposition should 
comprise an alliance consisting of groups ‘disadvantaged by globalisation’ extending 
beyond classes and more importantly beyond national borders, unified but diverse. He 
argues that this bloc must adopt an opposing ideology, social democratic, to bring about a 
‘war of position’, which paves the way for regime change, albeit not necessarily creating 
change. A war of position is described as an ‘integrated intellectual and political struggle’, 
which takes place on all levels from local to global and provides the social foundations for 
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a regime change (Katz 2006:336f). Class in this context covers the relationship to the 
means of production, which as described above should be understood in the broadest 
sense. 
For change to happen the bloc further has to evolve from being a passive ‘objectified 
thing’ to an agent taking initiative, and in this regard it is essential that the historic bloc 
“does not duplicate power disparities inherent in the existing world-system, avoids localism [and] 
nationalism, and promotes global solidarity through networking that links the local and the global”. The 
‘relations of force’ needs to change, meaning that the alternative historic bloc must 
increase its organisation, the strength of the alliances and the political consciousness (Katz 
2006:336f). 
 
NEO-GRAMSCIANISM AS THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND PARAMETERS 
FOR ANALYSIS 
As it appears the neo-Gramscian framework describes a struggle over ideas on a 
somewhat abstract level. This section therefore discusses how neo-Gramscian thought – 
as interpreted by the authors referred to above – can be applied in analysis of whether the 
formation of NGDO coalitions can be expected to strengthen the hegemonic or counter-
hegemonic features of GCS. To this end, I review the relevance and use of some of the 
key notions within neo-Gramscianism, namely the terms historic bloc, transformismo and war of 
position, in an NGDO coalition context. 
 
Historic blocs 
Finally it is necessary to discuss if the formation of NGDO coalitions affects the 
establishing of a global counter-hegemonic ‘historic bloc’. As Chapter 4 established, GCS 
at present can hardly be described as one movement with a common cause. But as also 
established the various groupings within GCS can be considered to possess an overall 
democratic potential insofar as GCS groups generally strive to improve the influence on 
decision-making on a global level of the general public.  
Katz has conducted a study of the structure of GCS. Departing from the dispute over 
GCS as either co-opted by hegemonic capitalist elites or as a field in which the existing 
hegemony can be opposed, he applies network analysis to test if the structure of GCS 
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resembles a hegemonic or counter-hegemonic structure. He assumes that if GCS supports 
the existing hegemony the study would demonstrate vast differences in the amount of 
links between North NGOs and South NGOs and generally an uneven GCS structure 
between the North and South with a core of international NGOs from developed 
countries. And further GCS would be fragmented and NNGOs would be more strongly 
connected with international governmental organisations (IGO) than with SNGDO 
counterparts (Katz 2006:337f). 
The study suggests that; first of all (and too surprisingly), the amount of organisations 
and links in the global network is larger in the developed world; second, the density of the 
global network is very limited; third, the global network comprises a core/semi-
periphery/periphery structure with a significant overrepresentation of Northern based 
international NGOs in the core; fourth, GCS is not fragmented, but on the contrary 
cohesive and both inclusive and diverse; and fifth, NGOs in the core of the global network 
do not have significantly more links with IGOs than NGOs in the periphery (Katz 
2006:340ff). Katz overall finds that the structure of GCS supports both a hegemonic and a 
counter-hegemonic explanation and concludes that GCS is in a transitional phase with the 
potential to develop into a counter-hegemonic bloc in the future (Katz 2006:333). 
Departing from Katz’ findings, I analyse whether the formation of coalitions, through 
their structure and links in GCS, can be expected to strengthen the potential for a counter-
hegemonic bloc or, conversely, strengthens the existing hegemonic structure.  
 
Other features also give an indication of whether an emerging historic bloc can be 
characterised as counter-hegemonic. One important parameter in this context is that civil 
society does not duplicate inherent power disparities. Applying this notion to the 
performance of NGDOs signifies that NGDOs should avoid promoting the ‘regressive’ 
features of globalisation for instance by pursuing an overall goal that might be considered 
benign per se, but ignoring or not paying attention to any socially eschewing side effects the 
efforts to achieve this goal produce. 
 Another is that the historic bloc should extend beyond classes with converging values 
of the comprised groups. Classes are – as already mentioned – defined by the relationship 
to the means of production, and the means of production should be understood in the 
broadest sense. Thus, in a context where the global stage is the arena for struggle, I 
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contend that the means of production should be interpreted as the power to influence the 
ideological course of economic development internationally, which is the permeating issue 
of international and global discourse. The counter-hegemonic historic bloc should 
therefore, according to neo-Gramscian thought, comprise elements of both marginalized 
groups – as Katz mentions – but also groups with actual influence on the hegemonic 
agenda. I.e. in scope of this analysis if the formation of NGDO coalitions should promote 
the constitution of a counter-hegemonic bloc, they either need to achieve agenda-setting 
status themselves or contribute to the swaying of agenda-setting institutions in a social 
democratic direction.  
Of course, one has to be careful directly applying theoretical concepts developed for a 
different framework. But if struggle over global ideological dominance is a constant one as 
argued earlier, rather than at some point coming to a conclusion, then swayed agenda-
setting institutions do not have to be a permanent part of a counter-hegemonic historic 
bloc, making the notion of a the historic bloc more applicable in the present context. And 
it can thus be argued that at least one – and maybe the only truly swayable – agenda-
setting IGO has historically been swayed by NGOs, namely the UN. 
 
The UN has increasingly been used by NGOs a venue for efforts of mobilising 
international state support for priority areas. Joachim argues that the UN due to a 
decentralised structure offers many access points for NGOs and that agenda setting in the 
UN can function as a tool for securing and extending political power. She further argues 
that although the UN does not possess mechanisms for enforcing decision, nor can claim 
to represent the interests of states, the agendas of the UN General Assembly are 
nonetheless often complied with by member states due to a ‘collective legitimisation 
function’ (Joachim 2003:249f). As such, states are susceptible to pressure – for instance 
generated from a leverage politics strategy – based on commitments to international 
agreements. 
 
Transformismo 
Gramsci originally used the term transformismo to describe the absorption of American 
management techniques by the Italian fascist regime. It thus describes the inclusion into 
the existing hegemony of oppositional forces or ideas and thereby diminishing of the 
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space for internal dissent. And can be considered a ‘passive revolution’ in which a new 
order is created from the top of the system in order to forestall and thereby dismantle 
political opposition to the existing political or economic system (Upchurch 2009:302). In 
the present context the introduction of the post-Washington Consensus might be 
interpreted as just this; a manner of defusing political opposition from civil society 
organisations by incorporating them into official strategies and thereby ultimately control 
the room for manoeuvre of the CSOs. 
 In an analytical context ‘Transformismo’ is a somewhat elusive concept. In Katz’ 
interpretation it is a method used by the co-opting forces to pacify opposing forces in 
(global) civil society by tolerating a certain degree of self-expression and assimilate 
potentially dangerous ideas in order to establish a political and cultural consensus (Katz 
2006:335). But one has to question whether he assimilation of ideas by hegemonic forces – 
in a struggle over ideas – cannot be interpreted as a success for counter-hegemonic forces. 
If for instance the World Bank includes suggestions or demands by a coalition of 
organisations advocating social change in a given programme, does it matter if the Bank 
adjusts a programme to maintain current ‘relations of force’ by assimilating a concept of 
social justice or because the Bank is pressurised through e.g. leverage politics? The 
rationale behind the programme adjustments might even be a combination of the two or 
merely depend on the applied point of view. The assumed risk, however, is that 
oppositional ideas are watered down. Upchurch argues that the establishment of a civil 
society accommodating to neoliberal ideas has the potential to ‘infect alternative or 
competing social projects’ so that the social democratic thought mutates into social 
liberalism (Upchurch 2009:302). 
 Analysing if coalition building entails a change in the risk of co-optation, I draw on two 
studies demonstrating the risk of co-optation in relations with IGOs. I.e. where Chapter 3 
discussed the potential for coalitions to increase influence on IGOs as compared to 
existing structures, this chapter instead focuses on whether NGDO coalitions can be 
expected to be more or less prone to co-optation through transformismo than 
independent organisations. 
 According to Corntassel co-optation occurs when for instance state actors within the 
UN system promote their own legitimacy through ‘blunting’ and ‘channelling’ effects. 
Blunting effects describes a practice of redefining a contesting agenda to fit with dominant 
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norms within the existing institutional structures (Corntassel 2007:140), by for instance 
applying liberal ideas to social democratic thought entailing a form of social liberalism in 
which some of the regressive features of liberalism can still prevail. Channelling effects 
describes the integration of opposing forces into the opposed system. I.e. policy advocates 
become professionalised and operate solely within the existing structure, rather than 
attempting to challenge the structure, which in the end might be the primary obstacle for 
the change they are trying to achieve. Corntassel argues that this is method of disengaging 
the grassroots (Corntassel 2007:140). Together, the practices of blunting and channelling 
creates an illusion of inclusion, where the policy advocates to be successful must ‘mimic the 
language and strategies’ of the opposed structure entailing a group of professionalised 
“delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities” 
(Corntassel 2007:161). 
 
Hegemonic consciousness and the war of position 
The notion of class has in the 21st century become an ambiguous and partly forgotten 
term. The framework of the proletariat as one class vis-à-vis the bourgeoisie no longer has 
any reference to the reality of today. According to Cox it has been mixed with a variety of 
‘identities’ – gender, ethnicity, religion etc. – through which identity is formed. He further 
argues that these identities are often subjectively opposed and susceptible to ‘manipulation 
by dominant powers in state and economy’ that have an interest in fragmentising 
opposition. The one feature these identities share is a common sentiment of being 
marginalized or excluded (Cox 1999:9, 15). 
 Related to the notion of class is the term consciousness. In Gramscian thought 
consciousness is not a direct derivative of class, but rather a historical construction in the 
natural, though not automatic, history of civil society. The lowest form of consciousness is 
termed ‘corporate consciousness’ where the ‘collective self-interest of people’ does not 
challenge status quo. The next level of consciousness is termed ‘class consciousness’ in 
which marginalized groups question the state and the societal architecture, emphasising 
the cleavage between different groups of society and a necessary development for 
fundamental social change and ultimately leading to the highest level of consciousness, 
termed ‘hegemonic consciousness’. In the context of today Cox argues that hegemonic 
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consciousness equals an understanding among marginalized groups of the nature and 
consequences of globalization (Cox 1999:15f, 26). 
 To reach a state in which marginalized groups have a hegemonic consciousness, a 
necessary basis is a, through public participation, animated civil society. However, as civil 
society is not animated by itself, it needs to be lead by ‘organic intellectuals’. Cox argues 
that these among others include trade union leaders, environmentalists and social activists on 
behalf of the poor. Civil society must be animated through a war of position, in which a 
counter-hegemonic bloc within society is created through a ‘long-term construction of 
self-conscious social groups’. Then when a war of position established a “combination of 
organized social forces strong enough to challenge the dominant power in society” political authority can 
be effectively challenged and replaced (Cox 1999:16ff). 
 
Gramscian thought, being developed to concern the national context, is not directly 
applicable to a global context, where there is no overarching and coercive state-like 
structure. However, the Gramscian notions are still useful in analysis of the attempts to 
influence the agenda of existing global decision-making institutions and in perhaps 
establishing new ones. While it might not be relevant to discuss the overthrowing of global 
decision-making structures as proposed in the traditional Gramscian framework, 
Gramscian thought also and primarily theorises on the ideological struggle leading to the 
overthrowing of the state. Thus, if we disregard ‘revolution’ as the only way to achieve 
greater social equity globally and accept that it can be achieve gradually, the neo-
Gramscian framework can be applied. Interestingly in this context Anderson argues that 
Gramsci’s own logic of the war of position eluded him and that against his own intention 
“formal conclusions can be drawn from his work that lead away from revolutionary socialism” 
(Anderson 1977:72). 
 
On global level then, to challenge the present global hegemony it is necessary that 
marginalized groups achieve hegemonic consciousness. But in Gramscian thought also 
elements of the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ are important allies for the marginalized groups in 
establishing a counter-hegemonic bloc (Cox 1999:15). Marginalized groups in this context 
must be considered to be the people of the South, which unquestionably are marginalized 
by the global political relations. The petty bourgeoisie allies accordingly could be 
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interpreted as civil society organisations, among these NGDOs, working to promote 
conditions of the marginalized groups. Along with the parts of the public in the North 
supporting a social change agenda. The ‘organic intellectuals’ can then be interpreted as 
being NGDOs. 
 Thus applying the neo-Gramscian framework entails that NGDOs, among others, in 
order to challenge the present global hegemony need to take the lead in achieving 
hegemonic consciousness in the marginalized groups. The role of the leaders is to clarify 
the political thinking of marginalized groups to a better understanding of their existing 
situation in society (Cox 1999:15). 
 
But this is not enough. An appropriate strategy according to Cox is to also continue 
participation in electoral politics and industrial action as ‘means of defensive resistance 
against the further onslaught of globalization’, while mobilising marginalized groups (Cox 
1999:27f). In emphasising this strategy as defensive, however, Cox neglects the potential to 
create change through engagement in decision-making procedures. With the focus on 
policy advocacy of this thesis in mind, I argue that it might as well function as an offensive 
strategy. In the original Gramscian thought the war of position was also, according to 
Anderson, a war of attrition where the two opposing camps attempt to undermine the 
other culturally and politically (Anderson 1977:58). In the present context conduction of 
IPA in which for instance large international actors are pressurised through mobilisation 
of shame or where political decisions are sought affected through leverage points can be 
interpreted as attempts to undermine a given agenda politically. Thus, I contend that IPA 
efforts play an equally important role in the war of position between GCS and the 
institutions and states representing the existing hegemony.  
However, this provides that engagement in IPA is based on attempts to create 
fundamental change by addressing structural issues. If IPA engagement is based on a 
concern to moderate existing policies, the strategy then can be characterised as defensive 
disregarding the purpose of undermining the hegemonic dominance. 
 
  43
CHAPTER 5: POLICY ADVOCACY AND THE WAR OF POSITION 
 
Having established how NGDO coalitions can be distinguished from TANs in a number 
of areas and the role of hegemonic consciousness in challenging a hegemonic bloc, this 
chapter analyses how the operational structure of NGDO coalitions can be expected to 
contribute to a the war of position. To this end, theory on international policy advocacy – 
which can be considered an essential element in achieving hegemonic consciousness in 
marginalized groups – is introduced. 
 
To begin by defining the basic rationale behind engaging in policy advocacy, Edwards 
provides a concise description. He asserts that NGDOs acknowledge the fact that 
fundamental change for the poor people around the globe is unlikely to occur if 
development initiatives are only carried out at local levels. Political forces at local, national 
and transnational levels can easily obstruct local development initiatives and these forces 
must be addressed to create sustainable change. He further argues that the growing 
internationalisation of economic and political processes and lack of accountability of the 
institutions in which these processes are rooted has increased the interest in policy 
advocacy at an international level (Edwards 1993:163). Edwards provides the following 
definition of international policy advocacy: 
 
“The basic rationale for Northern NGO advocacy is identified as an attempt to alter the ways in which power, 
resources, and ideas are created, consumed, and distributed at global level, so that people and their organisations 
in the South have a more realistic chance of controlling their own development” (Edwards 1993:164) 
 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ADVOCACY STRATEGIES 
Looking at how advocacy is conducted in practice Keck and Sikkink study the advocacy 
strategies applied by TANs in general and provide an analytical framework for the analysis 
of policy advocacy. In this framework the conduction of policy advocacy is described as 
‘the construction of cognitive frames’. These frames are constructed by creating responses 
in political culture and the public environment by interpreting information and events in 
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an internally coherent manner and disseminating this information – this practice is termed 
frame resonance (Keck and Sikkink 1999:95). In less ornamental words, policy advocacy can 
be considered an effort to alter the public opinion, including the opinion of decision-
makers, by applying alternative interpretations of common understandings. Keck and 
Sikkink have developed a typology of the tactics advocacy networks typically apply to 
achieve ‘frame resonance’. This typology consists of four different strategies: information 
politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. In the following 
sections these strategies are briefly presented followed by an analysis of how the 
operational structure NGDO coalitions can be expected to affect the application of the 
strategies. 
 
Information politics 
Information politics describes strategies of providing alternative information and putting it 
to use in a political context. By both formal and informal information exchanges – such as 
emails pamphlets, small newsletters etc – organisations can provide information, which 
would not otherwise be available. NGOs in a network can function as mediators of 
information from target groups of partners in South by collecting stories of people and 
then reframe these stories and the causes behind them to a relevant context so that the 
public can be mobilised and pressure is exerted on decisions-makers. This practice is 
termed ‘testimony’. In this manner testimonies serve to mobilise the public and more 
technical and statistical information or research is used to give credibility in the policy 
influencing process (Keck and Sikkink 1999:95f). 
 
Considering the distinctive features of NGDO coalitions as compared to TANs, some of 
these can be expected to provide coalitions with moderate advantages. With the more 
formalised communication channels and practices of a coalition the access to an assumed 
broader range and larger amount of information of the south, coalitions have better access 
to ‘testimonies’ than TANs. In comparison, in a more loosely tied network it requires a 
much greater effort to collect the same amount of information – if even possible – 
through partners. But besides an expected reduction in the gathering of information, the 
better access to testimonies is not likely to provide more than insignificant advantages in 
efforts of public mobilisation in general. However, regarding public mobilisation in the 
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South, NGDO coalitions must be expected to possess more significant advantages 
through their greater foundation in the South. The AAI coalition for instance has national 
members in Brazil, India, China and South Africa. This might prove a difference in global 
politics in the future when power relations are tipped even more towards the leading 
developing countries. But currently NGDO coalitions cannot be expected to posses any 
significant advantages within public mobilisation efforts. 
 
Considering contexts where formal information is necessary the more integrated 
communication channels of a coalition seems to provide some greater advantages. 
Looking for instance at the performance of AAI in connection with the 2010 MDG 
summit the integrated structure of AAI came to play an important role. At this summit 
AAI conducted a concentrated advocacy performance based on an extensive sharing of 
information. In the course towards the summit essential information useful to the 
influence of the decision-making process was exchanged between the different AAI 
members. And during the summit local knowledge, of when the politically most 
favourable moments to employ key information, was shared between the members so that 
information could have the highest impact (Sørensen 2011:interview). 
 Formal information is derived from research. As established in the previous chapter 
research is cost-extensive, but in this context NGDO coalitions possess an advantage 
through better possibilities of pooling resources and specialisation by division of labour. 
This is seen in Oxfam International where each Oxfam affiliate are specialised in selected 
trade topics and take the lead on these when relevant (Mably 2006:23). Further according 
to a study by Mably few organisations engaged in policy advocacy tend use research 
conducted by other organisations. The integrated and thereby more formalised 
communication channels of a coalition of organisations must be assumed to increase 
research sharing, and they thus also possess advantages within this field. 
 
Symbolic politics 
Another policy advocacy instrument, Symbolic politics, concerns the strategy of applying 
symbolic interpretations to significant events receiving public attention as a way to raise 
public awareness of policy areas. It is a way of using events or the juxtaposition of events 
as catalysts for the growth of networks and particular causes. As examples Keck and 
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Sikkink mention the use of the 500th year anniversary Columbus’ voyage to the Americas 
to raise awareness on indigenous people’s rights by indigenous people’s movement, or the 
juxtaposition of the hot summer in the USA in 1988 and footage of the Brazilian 
rainforest burning as way to put focus on global warming (Keck and Sikkink 1999:96f). 
Thus, the symbolic politics strategy is a way of using broadly available information by 
attempting to reframe this information in order to raise public awareness or mobilise the 
public. 
In this context NGDO coalitions cannot be assumed to possess any immediate 
advantages. Given that the amount of events is the same regardless of the interpreter and 
that the interpretive skills of an organisation is not likely in any significant degree to 
depend on the structure of the organisation, the frame resonance from interpreting events 
to a larger public should not increase significantly due to the distinctive features of 
NGDO coalitions. 
Further, the overall aim of NGDOs to promote social and economic development is 
per se a complex topic, which rarely can be linked to a single event. Events such as famine 
disasters are nearly always connected to more structural developmental issues, but in the 
public opinion they call for more immediate response typically conducted by relief 
organisations. Hence, public attention in relation to famine disasters will usually be related 
to relief work as relief work is much easier conveyed, while the developmental 
perspectives are shoved into the background. A few events e.g. the 50th anniversary of the 
World Bank have successfully been used by the ‘Fifty years is enough’ campaign as a 
symbolic politics strategy, but in the majority of such events decision-makers rather than 
the public are the primary targets. AAI for instance has conducted an extensive policy 
advocacy effort at both the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen, the 2010 MDG summit in New 
York and is now preparing for the Rio+20 in 2012, where work is being done to raise 
public awareness, but where the a massive effort is conducted to directly influence 
decision-makers (Sørensen 2011:interview). 
 
Leverage politics 
Leverage politics include methods of achieving leverage over more powerful actors by 
finding leverage points and powerful allies. Leverage points can either be in material terms, 
where advocacy aims to link e.g. loss of funds or influence with pursuing or dropping a 
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certain issue, or in moral terms where states or organisations are pressurised through 
‘mobilisation of shame’. In the framework provided by Keck and Sikkink more powerful 
members of the network are important in achieving leverage through located leverage 
points (Keck and Sikkink 1999:97). 
The understanding of powerful allies assumes a broad definition of networks to also 
include actors outside and above the NGO sector, and is immediately applicable to neither 
an NGDO coalition nor a TAN as defined in this thesis. NGDO coalitions and TANs are 
of course typically members of larger networks. AAI for instance cooperates with 
organisations such as the Bretton Woods Project and is member of the networks 
EURODAD and the Third World Network. But as this thesis concerns the separate ability 
of NGDO coalitions and TANs to conduct IPA, powerful actors as defined by Keck and 
Sikkink are not regarded. 
 
However, extending the understanding of powerful allies in Keck and Sikkink’s definition 
of leverage politics to also include institutions that only are influential in a limited context, 
inter alia, NGDOs as members of an NGDO coalition, both the operational and 
organisational structure of NGDO coalitions seem to provide some advantages compared 
to TANs.  
In a context of policy advocacy targeted at IGOs, specialised information is essential. 
The inclusion of a variety of organisations in NGDO coalitions thus provides a solid base 
for a broad range of competences and contacts, which can benefit a coalition as a whole. 
At high-level meetings, for instance, often the most significant civil society organisations 
are invited to participate in the respective national delegations. Including a range of 
organisations, which play an important role in their respective countries, a coalition 
thereby possesses a number of channels of influence through participation in otherwise 
restricted forums. In the case of AAI this has been evident at the COP15 and MDG 
summits, where AAI members have been part of a broad selection of the national 
delegations. The invitation to participate in these reflect the fact that by being part of AAI 
the individual members are considered to play an important role in national politics in 
their respective home countries (Sørensen 2011:interview). Hence, by encompassing a 
number of heterogeneous actors, rather than comprising a network of homogeneous 
actors as the typical TAN, NGDO coalitions can be expected to gain access to a greater 
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number of different forums, thereby increasing potential to influence decision-makers 
through leverage. 
Access to these forums also functions as a source of information. Due to the coalition 
membership of ActionAid Brazil for instance, AAI has access to the actual negotiations 
and thereby possesses knowledge of the position of an agenda-setting middle-income 
country in given decisions. Or through representation in the Bangladeshi representation, 
AAI can achieve insights into positions and internal conflicts of the G77 (Sørensen 
2011:interview). This sort of information is essential when locating leverage points. 
 
Accountability politics as described by Keck and Sikkink resembles moral leverage politics but 
describes the more direct method of holding states or organisations accountable to 
commitments or endorsed policies (Keck and Sikkink 1999:97). Keck and Sikkink offer 
very limited space to describing this approach, which hardly – and maybe because of this – 
can be defined as a strategy but rather should be considered a goal for which the strategies 
described above aim. 
 
INCREMENTAL VS. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 
As argued in the previous chapter, for NGDO coalitions to engage ‘offensively’ in the war 
of position it is necessary that IPA efforts seek to create fundamental change. Thus, we 
now turn to discussing the expected nature of the IPA engagement of NGDO coalitions. 
To this end, Edwards provides what he terms a ‘simple conceptual framework of NGO 
advocacy’. 
Edwards finds that there exist two different forms of IPA (though acknowledging that 
the distinction between these is an abstraction, which does not necessarily exist in 
practice). He distinguishes between ‘attempts to influence global-level processes, 
structures, or ideologies’ and ‘attempts to influence specific policies, programmes, or 
projects’ characterising the first as an aim to create fundamental change, while the second is 
characterised as an aim to facilitate incremental change (Edwards 1993:164). 
 Aims to create fundamental change are characterised by addressing major issues, like 
the neo-liberal economic agenda, and are likely to be confrontational. This form of 
advocacy in general requires substantial support from grassroots in order to build up 
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public pressure and be successful (Edwards 1993:164). Aims to facilitate incremental 
change is characterised by a more dialogue-oriented approach and may address specific 
programmes of e.g. the World Bank. In these cases the institutions, at which the advocacy 
efforts are targeted, often welcome these efforts and the presented alternatives, as these 
are often the result of technical knowledge and the policy advocacy is not to the same 
degree characterised by political disagreement. It is, however, important to point out that 
arguably the one form of policy advocacy cannot be successful without the other. Detailed 
policy advocacy needs to achieve public support and media attention because, as Edwards 
puts it, NGOs ‘can easily be co-opted, and the targets of their advocacy may adopt 
superficial reforms’ (Edwards 1993:164). 
 
Expanding Edwards’ concepts of fundamental and incremental change and applying a 
more concrete definition of the NGDO policy effort, the typologies of Mably (2006) 
supplement Edwards’ abstraction and contribute to elaborating the 
fundamental/incremental dichotomy. In an International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) study of the relationship between NGO research and policy influence on trade 
policy Mably deduces four types of policy influence as result of policy advocacy (Mably 
2006:26ff).  
 The first, affecting policy debates, refers to NGO efforts of influencing selected debates 
through interaction with targeted stakeholders. In this category it is not relevant whether 
actual policy change occur, but rather if the NGO and its partners have success in coming 
through as credible and in affecting the terms on which the debate takes place and maybe 
even create a broader policy horizon. In this sense, efforts to affect policy debates can be 
seen as a way of creating incremental change. By influencing focus of political debates on 
different topics and levels NGOs can pursue selected policy targets and ideally mitigate 
socially flawed policies. While this type of influence is difficult to measure the direct 
results of – a fact the NGOs openly acknowledge – Mably describes a number of cases in 
which the NGOs believe advocacy has had an actual effect (Mably 2006:28f). To give one 
example, Oxfam International credits research on cotton to have influenced four West 
African countries to bring US cotton subsidies to the WTO in connection with the 
Cancún ministerial meeting. 
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 The second, affecting policy regimes, covers efforts that induce actual policy change. The 
result of these efforts is harder to achieve and occurs more rarely, but typically includes 
new or amended laws, regulations or decision-making structures. One example could be 
the case of the global NGO campaign lead by Médicin Sans Frontiers, including among 
others ActionAid, which forced 39 pharmaceutical companies to withdraw a lawsuit 
against South Africa for importing HIV/AIDS drug replica, and the following statement 
of the WTO meeting that the TRIPS ‘should not prevent members from taking measures 
to protect public health’ (Mably 2006:3). 
 The third, developing new policy regimes, covers efforts to pressure target groups to develop 
policy on emerging areas in which no policy has previously existed. This is even more 
difficult to achieve than ‘merely’ affecting existing policy regimes and the successful cases 
are rare. Among these are NGO achievements of making the EU adopt an action on 
commodities, of making the FAO adopt a policy on farmer’s rights, and of putting the 
cross-border movement of GMOs on the agenda of the Convention on Biological 
diversity (Mably 2006:31). 
 The fourth type, expanding policy capacities, refers to the internal strengthening of the 
NGO, which conducts advocacy and of the partners of the NGO and is thus not relevant 
in the context of this thesis. 
 Thus, affecting policy debates fits the characterisation by Edwards of incremental change as 
characterised by a more dialogue-oriented approach and may address specific programmes. 
While affecting policy regimes and developing new policy regimes fits the characterisation by 
Edwards of fundamental change. 
 
So can the formation of NGDO coalitions be expected to influence conducted IPA 
towards a more fundamental change approach? In this context, primarily one feature 
which distinguishes NGDO coalitions from TANs seem to be able to constitute a 
difference, namely the enhanced research capacity of coalitions. Efforts of advocating 
fundamental change will only be perceived as legitimate if the policy advocates at the same 
time can provide a sound and well-documented alternative. And providing reasonable 
policy alternatives to for instance IMF conditionalities for a given country unquestionably 
necessitates a significant research effort. Hence, NGDO coalitions through their enhanced 
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research capacity can be expected to possess advantages in affecting policy regimes and 
developing new policy regimes. 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF NGDO COALITIONS TO THE WAR OF POSITION 
As argued in the previous chapter the war of position can be waged on two fronts; by 
leading marginalized groups and their ‘petty bourgeoisie’ allies into a state of hegemonic 
consciousness; and by engaging in global decision-making to challenge the existing 
hegemony. 
 In this chapter I argued that NGDO coalitions cannot be expected to possess any 
significant advantages in mobilising the public in general in order to achieve policy change. 
I asserted that NGDO coalitions through their relative larger southern-based membership 
possess a comparative advantage in mobilising the public in the South, but that this cannot 
be considered to constitute a significant difference in an IPA perspective. However, in a 
neo-Gramscian perspective this can be expected to constitute a significant difference. 
Where TANs typically try to raise awareness in the North to establish public pressure in 
the countries that are influential in international politics, NGDO coalitions have a 
significantly greater potential to raise awareness in the South. By comprising Southern-
based organisations the link to specialised information is reduced, increasing the potential 
for southern-based coalition members to assume the role of ‘organic intellectuals’. 
Additionally for southern-based organisations joining a coalition will often experience a 
growing legitimacy by becoming members of a ‘big logo’ organisation (Sørensen 
2011:interview), which further increases the potential for the southern-based members of 
a coalition to become ‘organic intellectuals’. 
Turning to the capacity of NGDO coalitions to achieve influence on global decision-
making processes, I argued that coalitions compared to TANs possess advantages applying 
a leverage politics strategy. Due to their operational structure they have access to a greater 
amount of forums of influence and information about leverage points. Thus in a neo-
Gramscian framework they have the potential to challenge the existing hegemony more 
efficiently than existing advocacy networks. 
Finally, I argued that NGDO coalitions due to enhanced research capacity are better 
predisposed for applying a fundamental approach in policy advocacy efforts. 
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6: COUNTER-HEGEMONIC BLOCS AND TRANSFORMISMO 
 
Proceeding with an analysis of how the organisational structure of NGDO coalitions this 
chapter analyses how this structure can be expected to contribute to the formation of a 
historic bloc and further whether it can provides any resistance against transformismo. 
 
COUNTER-HEGEMONIC HISTORIC BLOC 
Analysing whether coalition formation can be expected to increase the contentious 
features of GCS, I draw on parameters applied by Katz. I.e. the formation of NGDO 
coalitions should – in order to strengthen the counter-hegemonic features of GCS – 
promote a GCS structure where NGDOs from the North and the South is evenly 
represented and have equal influence and contribute to GCS being an ‘agent’ that is taking 
initiative. While avoiding the duplication of inherent power disparities and the regressive 
features of globalisation and avoiding having stronger ties with IGOs than with SNGDO 
counterparts. If coalition building cannot be expected to fulfil these criteria, the tendency 
of coalition formation must be considered to strengthen the hegemonic features of GCS. 
 
To begin with the structure of GCS, Katz’ study shows that the links of global network of 
international NGOs is skewed towards the North, and that there exists a clear core/semi-
periphery/periphery structure regarding closeness to the core of the global network. 
Reviewing distribution of members by country of two of the largest coalitions, the ACT 
Alliance and AAI, the structure of these coalitions break with this pattern. Merely 
considering the headquarters of the member organisations, a count shows that in the ACT 
Alliance only 30% of the member organisations (34 of 113) are based in the North 
(actalliance.org), while for AAI it is 27% of the member organisations (10 of 37) that are 
based in the North (actionaid.org). Obviously these numbers do not reveal anything about 
the internal relations of power of the two coalitions, and the information on the respective 
websites also indicates that Northern-based members are larger and more economically 
well founded. But with the one member-one vote principal of AAI at least formally the 
influence of AAI is more evenly distributed than the results from Katz’ study. Also ACT
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Alliance has a governance structure where the members of the governing board represents 
fairly the different regions of the world, albeit members of the North are over represented 
in the executive board where 6 of 11 members are from the North (actalliance.org).  
 Informally there might very well exist power disparities. The policy advisor of AAD 
stated that the South affiliates do not participate in e.g. the annual World Bank meetings, 
because the AAI priorities are to establish political space for the South to operate in. 
Rather it is the international policy manager of AAI, who is a US citizen, which 
participates in these meetings and therefore is responsible for representing the advocacy 
interests of AAI, indicating some duplication of existing power disparities of global 
relations (Sørensen 2011:interview). Thus, while this division of labour between the North 
and South affiliates of AAI may or may not constitute a sensible organisation in the case 
of AAI, in general it definitely contains a risk of eschewing the influence on the strategy of 
a coalition and of preventing reflection on this direction. And to a certain degree indicates 
duplication of existing power disparities of global relations.  
But solely regarding the amount of relations between NGDOs internationally, the 
forums that the two NGDO coalitions provide quantitatively increases the links for 
Southern-based organisations to both the North and the South significantly. This assertion 
is substantiated if one reviews the ACT Alliance. A clear picture appears when examining 
the descriptions of the member organisations; where almost every Northern-based 
member lists a number of Southern-based partners, the vast majority of Southern-based 
members hardly list any partners, in rare cases one or two. The ACT Alliance in its present 
form has only existed since 2010, and the listed partners give an indication of the 
individual member organisations’ links to other organisations before the creation of ACT 
Alliance. 
Considering the pronounced core-periphery structure that Katz’ results show, this 
structure must be expected to be reduced with the coalition formation. The inclusion in 
coalitions of a number of SNGDOs significantly reduces the distance to the ‘core’ of the 
international NGDO network for these organisations. Where the primary connection of 
these organisations to the international network before joining a coalition arguably has 
been through Northern-based partners, they now have a formal seat in an organisation, 
which for instance – in the case of AAI – is an important member of networks such as the 
Global Network, Eurodad and SOLIDAR. 
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Turning to the criteria for the counter-hegemonic bloc to extend beyond ‘classes’, I argued 
above that the use of the UN as a forum for promoting an alternative ideology can be 
considered to satisfy this criteria. So can the formation of NGDO coalitions be expected 
to enhance relations with agenda-setting powers through a forum such as the UN and 
thereby promote the establishment of a historic bloc? 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the policy advisor of MS reported that upon joining the 
AAI, MS has come to benefit from the ECOSOC status, which AAI already enjoyed. 
ECOSOC is the principal organ to coordinate economic, social and related work of the 
UN and ‘serves as the central forum for discussing international economic and social 
issues, and for formulating policy recommendations addressed to member states and the 
United Nations system’ (un.org). Around 3,500 NGOs enjoy consultative status with 
ECOSOC. According to the UN website “[c]onsultative status provides NGOs with access to not 
only ECOSOC, but also to its many subsidiary bodies, to the various human rights mechanisms of the 
United Nations, ad-hoc processes on small arms, as well as special events organized by the President of the 
General Assembly” (csonet.org). In other words enjoying consultative status entails a not 
insignificant influence in intergovernmental decision-making forums. Joachim, for 
instance, demonstrates that women’s organisations through the UN have had success in 
getting the issues of violence against women and reproductive rights on the UN agenda, 
resulting in actual policy changes in some member states (Joachim 2003:247f). 
 A number of requirements are to be fulfilled for NGOs to obtain ECOSOC 
consultative status. However, “NGOs affiliated to an international organization already in status 
may be admitted provided that they can demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to 
the aims and purposes of the United Nations” (csonet.org). And this plays an important role for 
NGDO coalitions. In the case of AAI, the organisation ActionAid already enjoyed 
consultative status when AAI was formed in 2003. I.e. the AAI coalition has eased – or 
maybe even made possible – the process of obtaining ECOSOC influence for every 
organisation joining AAI subsequently due to the above. Having formed in 2010 ACT 
Alliance does not yet as an organisation enjoy ECOSOC status, but it likely has a more 
than reasonable chance of obtaining the status and hence providing the same advantages 
as the AAI members for the ACT Alliance members.  
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In sum, coalition building can be expected to increase the potential for a counter-
hegemonic bloc to extend beyond classes. 
 
Further, studies suggest that IGOs are more interested in working together with NGO 
coalitions representing a significant amount of organisations. Mundy and Murphy 
describes how – in a study of NGO advocacy in relation to the Dakar 2000 World 
Education Forum – IGOs and states in speeches formally endorsed the Global Campaign 
for Education and recognised the GCE as representation for civil society. Several high 
level officials even held meetings with representatives of the GCE. Thus the GCE came to 
assume a dominant role among the nongovernmental representatives (Mundy and Murphy 
2001:117ff). While the prioritisation by IGOs and states of an advocacy coalition in 
consulting and listening to civil society might seem unfair to the NGOs not represented in 
the campaign, this is not too surprising. If time is limited, which is the case at every high 
level meeting, it seems natural to choose to include a coalition, which must be considered 
to represent the largest amount of people. Thus, the significant number or organisations 
represented in NGDO coalitions must be expected to increase the potential influence of 
NGDO coalitions. 
 
TRANSFORMISMO 
However, access to UN decision-making forums far from automatically entails positive 
results in the shape of desired policy changes. The risk of co-optation is certainly present. 
Corntassel demonstrates this in a study of the efforts of indigenous people’s advocacy 
networks during the UN Indigenous Decade. Departing from Keck and Sikkink’s five-part 
model he analyses the lack of results from the efforts of indigenous advocacy networks – 
adding a sixth factor, co-optation – and finds a lack of ‘any substantive discursive shifts in 
state behaviour’ regarding indigenous rights at the end of UN Indigenous Decade 
(Corntassel 2007: 137, 163). He concludes that the shortcomings of the UN Indigenous 
Decade regarding actual policy change – in notable contrast with the results of women’s 
movements by the end of the Women’s Decade – is due to “mainstreaming” of 
indigenous rights in the UN system through co-optation. Mainstreaming refers to the 
success of including indigenous rights in official strategies but failure of transforming 
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rhetoric into practical effect. He explains this co-optation with the blunting and 
channelling effects (Corntassel 2007: 162f). 
 
So can coalition building be expected to decrease the risk of NGDOs to be co-opted? 
Research suggests that also NGDOs engaging with an institution such as the World Bank 
risk being exposed to an illusion of inclusion. In a study of education priorities in Niger 
mandated by the World Bank through the conditionalities of Niger’s poverty reduction 
strategy paper, Murphy argues that civil society has been co-opted into supporting an 
education programme virtually dismantling the teaching profession and eroding the 
second and tertiary education sector in the country (Murphy 2005:363ff). In this program 
the support of international NGOs, including Oxfam International and other international 
organisations, was secured through the inclusion of an umbrella group called Global 
Campaign for Education (GCE), which together with the World Bank launched the Fast 
Track Initiative3 (Murphy 2005:365). Through the World Bank’s formal partnership with 
international NGOs of the GCE, Murphy argues, the enforcement of questionable 
education policies were legitimised with minimal consulting of governmental agencies and 
grassroots organisations. And although protests from members of the GCE have been 
voiced, they have had no impact on the policies enforced in practice. Further, Murphy 
argues that the Bank has excluded grassroots organisations with differing opinions from 
the consultation process, and that (Murphy 2005:369, 371). The behaviour of the World 
Bank in this case, can easily be characterised as blunting. 
 
This study – not surprisingly – demonstrates that while an NGDO coalition like Oxfam 
International may be a significantly stronger actor internationally than independent 
organisations, it is still not strong enough to resist the blunting effects applied by the 
World Bank. Murphy remains rather critical towards the international NGOs and 
indirectly ascribes the blunting of the international NGOs to the implicit or explicit view 
of NGO leaders that their organisational legitimacy is greater than that of development 
countries’ governments (Murphy 2005:370). Thus, they are responsive to the invitations of 
                                                 
3
 The Education for All Fast-track Initiative (from September 21, 2011 the Global Partnership for Education) is 
an international compact of donors and development countries focusing on funding the enrolment of children to 
school in poor countries (educationforallblog.org) 
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the World Bank to participate in the education programme, not regarding the limitations 
of this participation. 
 This view cannot be expected to be any less pronounced with formation of NGDO 
coalitions. Looking for instance at the draft for the AAI’s international strategy 2012-2017, 
the strategy states that AAI building on decades of achievements and strong partnership 
“will work with children, parents and teachers […] to make sure that government schools exist and respect 
the rights of girls and boys, open minds, and nurture values of equality and justice” (AAI 2011:14). 
There is recognition in AAI though, that local programmes ‘need to be linked upwards to 
national level’ (AAI 2011:10) indicating an understanding of the importance of existing 
state structures in target countries, which to a certain degree contradicts the alleged shared 
agenda of NGDOs and the World Bank to diminish the role of the state as argued by 
Murphy. This recognition, however, should not been seen as directly related to the 
formation of coalition but rather as a result of general development tendencies. 
 In the case of AAI there is nothing either in the official strategies that indicates a 
reduction in the efforts of collaborating with the World Bank and other institutions in 
order to promote AAI’s own agenda. Conversely, where AAI prior to 2005 in a campaign 
context has “tended to focus heavily on micro-level service delivery and the empowerment of individuals 
through self-help groups”, AAI is now upgrading efforts to address structurally related poverty 
on an international level (AAI 2010:33).  
 Considering the risk of “mainstreaming”, Corntassel emphasises lack of unity among 
indigenous groups as a factor for the unsuccessful advocacy efforts of the indigenous 
movements (Corntassel 2007:165). Also Mundy and Murphy emphasises internal 
disagreement among the NGOs in their study of the Global Campaign for Education, 
pointing to the critique from southern-based NGOs and members of the campaign itself 
that the campaign was dominated by a few northern-based NGOs (Mundy and Murphy 
2001:119). In this context, NGDO coalitions can be expected to reduce the risk of co-
optation to a certain degree by securing a more centralised and coordinated advocacy 
efforts where a political stance can be assumed to be agreed upon before participating in 
decision-making forums, and further through their organisational structure. 
In sum, besides from a reduced risk of co-optation due to internal disagreement, there 
is not much in the NGDO coalition structure that indicates a reduced risk of being co-
opted through collaboration with IGOs. This would on the other hand also be somewhat 
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surprising as the risk of blunting does not seem to be a widely acknowledged fact in the 
NGDO environment in general. 
 
Murphy’s case also clearly demonstrates that the World Bank make use of channelling 
effects. By cooperating with organisations that are members of GCE, the Bank shows an 
apparent inclusion of civil society. But to become member of GCE an organisations needs 
to fulfil a list of demands, have access to the Internet, and be capable, both physically and 
economically, of paying USD 100 for one year’s membership (GCE:8). And last but not 
least the organisation needs to be aware that GCE exists – a fact, which the leader of one 
of the most important Nigerien grassroots organisations in Murphy’s case was not aware 
of (Murphy 2005:365). Thus, by choosing a global organisation as ally, the World Bank has 
– intentionally or not – effectively ruled out the influence of organisations representing the 
people, whom the Bank policy actually affects. 
 So does coalition formation give a promise of greater inclusion of the grassroots in 
IPA? Looking at AAI the answer is no. Although as argued AAI has reduced the distance 
to the grass roots by establishing a democratic federation including SNGDOs, the 
interview with the policy advisor of ActionAid Denmark revealed a centralised practice 
within the policy work targeted at the IGOs where one person – an American – is the 
primary responsible for participating in IGO decision-making forums (Sørensen 
2011:interview). With one person as the primary IPA responsible in a coalition of 
organisations it must be assumed that the range of interests represented in the interaction 
with IGOs is significantly more limited than if the same number of organisations engaged 
in IPA with the same IGOs independently. Further it must be assumed that all things 
being equal, a centralised practice of conducting policy advocacy is more susceptible to the 
form of channelling, where the representatives conducting advocacy become so integrated 
in the system that they forget to challenge the system and their allegiances might even 
shift. As Murphy asserts: if an institutional theory perspective is applied ‘movement 
leaders may also operate from individual and organizational vested interests’ (Murphy 
2005:361). I.e. in some cases policy advocates might act to promote their own career 
opportunities even though their actions are not in the interest or even contradict the 
objectives of the organisation they represent. 
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In sum, the formation of NGDO coalitions does not per se reduce the risk of 
channelling effects, not even in the case of the relatively progressive coalition of AAI. 
 
  60 
CHAPTER 7: THE CONTENTIOUS POTENTIAL OF COALITIONS 
 
Summing up on the analysis in the two previous chapters it can be concluded that some 
features of the NGDO coalition structure can be expected to possess a greater 
contentious capacity as compared to existing TANs, while others cannot. 
 Beginning with the contentious features organisational structure of NGDO coalitions 
can be expected to increase the formation of a historic bloc. Although there are still some 
display of an eschewed participation in IPA among NNGDOs and SNGDOs, through a 
greater amount of links with organisations in the South coalitions reduce the tendency of 
existing TANs to ‘duplicate’ existing global power disparities. Further, NGDO coalitions 
can be expected to receive more attention from agenda-setting institutions and states, 
increasing the potential to increase cooperation beyond ‘classes’. 
 The increased attention that NGDO coalitions can be expected to receive must is also 
be considered to strengthen the counter-hegemonic bloc in the war of position. Increased 
responsiveness from IGOs and agenda-setting states can, along with a greater knowledge 
of leverage points through enhanced coordination, be expected to increase the influence 
of NGDO coalitions in decision-making forums. Other things being equal this entails a 
promotion of social-democratic interests. Further the enhanced research capacity of 
NGDO coalitions provide them with a greater potential for advocating fundamental 
change. The promotion of social democratic interests can also be expected to enhance on 
a different level. Through the increased potential to mobilise people in the South of 
NGDO coalitions, which according to neo-Gramscian theory represents the groups that 
need to achieve hegemonic consciousness. 
 Finally NGDO coalitions can be expected to reduce one factor that constitutes a risk 
for co-optation when interacting with IGOs, namely internal disagreement among the 
partners of a policy coalition. The organisational structure of NGDO coalitions and the 
fact that they can engage in advocacy as a single organisation practically eliminates this 
risk.
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However, NGDO coalition building cannot be expected to affect other factors 
constituting a risk for co-optation. The policy advocacy practice of AAI demonstrates that 
the operational structure does not per se reflect the organisational structure, i.e. the 
enhanced representation of southern-based organisations in AAI does not appear to be 
reflected in the policy advocacy practice. This entails that NGDO coalitions are equally 
exposed to channelling effects. If only a small group of people are responsible for the 
entire interaction with IGOs they are thereby at risk of losing connection to the work of 
the organisation through a professionalization of the advocacy work. Considering the 
relative progressive features of AAI, characterising it as a critical case, it cannot 
immediately be assumed that practice is different in other coalitions. 
 
Overall it should be mentioned that these conclusions concern the potential for NGDO 
coalitions to constitute a more contentious force in GCS. This potential in several cases 
assume a practice in the constitutionally rooted spirit of NGDO coalitions, which in reality 
might prove less common. As we know, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
Thus, if coalitions – in spite of their constitutionally established obligations to do so – fail 
to establish democratically solid decision-making practices where every subject potentially 
can be debated, they risk falling back on ‘common knowledge’. And in the worst case not 
being able rise above the influence pattern of the North-South divide. For instance, asked 
how AAI ensures the representation of interests of the South affiliates, the policy advisor 
of AAD answered, “everyone knows the priorities” [my translation] and that these priorities are 
established every second year.  
Further, it should be mentioned that the concluded potential, self-evidently, does not 
give an indication of to what degree GCS can be considered to become more contentious. 
Separate studies of NGDO coalitions are needed both to test the proposed hypothesis in 
general and to determine the actual move of GCS towards contention. However, for the 
model to constitute any significant difference in GCS requires it to become more 
widespread than it is at present. 
 
The validity of the various generalisations made in the analysis, which are based on the 
included cases should also be addressed briefly. With reference to the success of women’s 
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organisations in achieving substantial policy change in their advocacy efforts targeted at 
the UN I assume that this success can also be obtained by NGDO coalitions. Joachim 
finds that the success of these organisations primarily can be ascribed to the political 
opportunity structure in which the organisations are embedded and to the mobilising 
structures available to NGOs in general (Joachim 2003:247). It therefore seems solid to 
assume that the success of the women’s organisations is achievable for all advocacy 
organisations under the right circumstances 
 Based on a reference to the study of Mundy and Murphy where the GCE due to its size 
receive more positive attention from decision-makers, I conclude that NGDO coalitions 
can be expected to also experience increased attention based on their size. The GCE is 
significantly larger than the model of NGDO coalition assumed in this thesis comprising a 
number of large international NGOs, including Oxfam International and ActionAid, 
before it evolved into its present state (Mundy and Murphy 2001:110). Hence, the 
generalisation from this case might to a certain degree be questioned. However, Mundy 
and Murphy emphasise the degree of coordination within the GCE as a determining factor 
for the responsiveness from IGOs, and with precisely this feature being a quality of 
NGDO coalitions I find it safe assume that NGDO coalition can also potentially enjoy 
this attention. 
 I further assume from the case of the co-optation of indigenous peoples’ movements 
that NGDO coalitions are exposed to same risk of co-optation through channelling 
effects. As also argued NGDO coalitions this can very well be assumed to occur in the 
case of NGDOs. Albeit it might be argued that the NGDOs’ dependence on state funds 
signifies that they are in regular contact donors – and thus more familiar with the lingua of 
IGOs in their competence field – and thereby to a certain degree reduces the risk of 
“mainstreaming” in general. 
 Finally, from the co-optation of Oxfam International in the case presented by Murphy I 
assume that also NGDO coalitions can be co-opted through blunting effects based on the 
self-perceived legitimacy in NGDOs. Considering the degree of networking among 
NGDOs and the distinctive character of the discourse within the development 
environment in general, there does not seem to be any particular reasons to assume vast 
differences in the self-perceived legitimacy among the large and internationally established 
development organisations. 
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CHAPTER 8: THE ROLE OF NGDO COALITIONS IN GLOBAL 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Having established the contentious potential of NGDO coalitions this chapter discusses these 
in relation to the critique presented in Chapter 2 of GCS, and the organisations comprising 
GCS, as a space for political contention. 
 
Beginning with the specific critique of NGOs, which constitute the largest amount of 
organisations in GCS, the arguments primarily concern three issues; that NGOs generally have 
a predetermined set of values and inherit ideas of what can and cannot be politically 
accepted, which risks excluding the people they claim to represent; weak links to the 
grassroots in general; and that they in many areas are driven by material concerns, rather than 
ideological beliefs. Can NGDO coalitions be expected to accommodate these points of 
critique? 
 Considering the critique of the predetermined set of values, the immediate answer is no. 
The AAI constitution, for instance, states that one of the federal principles of AAI is 
respecting diversity by taking into account “national and regional contexts and the individual natures 
and characteristics of Members” (AAI 2009:4). But at the same time states that the members shall 
abide by a number of core values including “Honesty and transparency [by] being accountable at all 
levels for the effectiveness of their actions and open in their judgements and communications with others” and 
“Independence from any religious or party-political affiliation” (AAI 2009:6). While these principles 
might seem reasonable in the practical management of a transnational coalition comprising a 
range of organisations with different backgrounds, from a cultural relativist point of view 
these principles can easily be argued have roots in a Western cultural tradition. Thus, there 
undoubtedly exists a number of grassroots organisations rooted in different cultures that 
could be excluded on the basis of these principles – provided that they are enforced to the 
letter. So if being based on a set of values that in certain areas can be considered to converge 
with the values of the institutions constituting the existing hegemony disqualifies NGDO 
coalitions from being truly contentious, then NGDO coalitions in their present form cannot 
be considered to promote the contentious features of GCS. However, according to Gramscian 
thought, this is not the case as argued below. 
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 In continuation hereof it is also necessary to consider links to the grassroots. While the 
case of AAI – as earlier described – does not indicate a practice of greater inclusion of 
southern interests in IPA, the distance to the grassroots must be considered reduced in the 
case of NGDO coalitions. In many cases the southern coalitions members can be expected to 
be professionalised development organisations, which might not be considered to directly 
represent the grassroots, but the fact that SNGDOs can participate on equal terms in the 
NGDO coalitions reduces the cultural gap and the physical distance between the grassroots 
and the conductors of IPA on a global level. 
 Finally NGOs are being criticised for focusing more on material concerns than values and 
for campaigning with a campaign concern. However, the validity of this argument is inversely 
proportional with the actual effect of the advocacy efforts. If organisations are primarily 
concerned with raising funds for campaigning to continue existing but still demonstrates 
results in achieving the overall objective of the organisations, then the efforts to survive as 
organisations can be justified as these efforts converge with the purpose of the organisation. 
As Covey argues that “policy influence campaigns can be carried out in ways that strengthen grass roots 
organizations and their direct voice in affairs affecting them, or they can be implemented by intermediaries 
for whom the grass roots are clients” (Covey 1994:2). This is true disregarding the intentions of 
the organisations conducting IPA. 
It is only when efforts to continue existing as organisations begin to overshadow or replace 
efforts to achieve the objective of the organisations that material concerns can be questioned. 
Nonetheless, this is also a legitimate concern. The studies of Mundy and Murphy suggest that 
large NGOs in the 1990s went ‘venue shopping’, i.e. choosing to engage in IPA concerning 
education to increase their legitimacy because this was an issue already emphasised by IGOs 
(Mundy and Murphy 2001:124). Obviously, strategic choices like these significantly limit – if 
not exclude – the potential to apply a truly contentious approach to IPA. 
 As NGDO coalitions are comprised of NGDOs, which as argued in Chapter 3 to a certain 
degree are driven by strategic concerns, NGDO coalitions cannot be expected in any 
significant degree to be less opportunistic than independent organisations. In an RDP 
approach NGDO coalitions are still depending on the same resources as independent 
organisations and the sum of available funds remains constant. But the fact that 
organisations are opportunistic and seek to promote their owns interests does not – as 
argued – rule out the possibility of including the grass roots. The inclusion of SNGDOs in 
coalitions does by no means warrant inclusion of the grass roots per se, but the potential 
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for the people of poor communities to realise their selfhood through action addressing 
global mechanisms is increased with a reduced distance to influence. 
 
In sum, the formation of NGDO coalitions does not seem to significantly refute the critique 
of NGOs as agents of change, besides maybe a slight increase in the connection to the 
grassroots. However, this does not necessarily imply that NGDO coalitions cannot contribute 
to a more contentious GCS as has been argued here and that the conclusions of the previous 
chapter are invalid. Rather it is an indication of a divergence between the GCS critics and the 
neo-Gramscian thought in the understanding of how contention can materialise. This 
divergence becomes apparent when the critique of GCS as a space for political contention is 
considered 
In the general critique of GCS as a space for political contention, the arguments primarily 
concern the nature of GCS. It is argued that GCS is functioning in a structure defined by the 
hegemonic institutions and states and thus the organisations of GCS are prevented from 
challenging the structure. It is implicitly assumed that the structure cannot be challenged 
through the fundamental mechanisms of the structure itself. More concretely it is argued that 
the organisations of GCS are subject to the same (capitalist) mechanisms, which cause the 
social inequity that they are trying to reduce, preventing them from fundamentally addressing 
this inequity. And it is argued that by engaging in dialogue with hegemonic institutions, such 
as the World Bank, GCS organisations legitimise the agenda of the hegemonic forces. 
 
Considering these points of critique initially it is necessary to emphasise that the critics of 
GCS in many cases commit the same mistake as Pasha and Blaney accuse the adherents of 
GCS of. Pasha and Blaney argue that the GCS proponents imagine GCS, through what they 
term a ‘transnational associational life’, as an ‘unambiguous force for democratisation of a 
global civil society’. While in reality the organisations comprising GCS to a certain degree 
promote the same liberal values as the hegemonic institutions (Pasha and Blaney 1998:418f). 
But this is in many cases also apparent the other way around. Arguing that GCS is co-opted by 
or support the agenda of a group of hegemonic institutions and states, per se assumes a unified 
hegemonic bloc of institutions and states promoting a shared agenda. Thus, it is neglected that 
these institutions and states in many cases cannot be considered hard-line neoliberalist, and 
that they also in some cases can be considered to promote a social-democratic agenda – 
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provided that global relations are explained by factors extending beyond those emphasised in 
realist theory. 
 The view that GCS cannot challenge the existing hegemonic bloc if it shares certain 
features or values with the hegemonic bloc is in opposition to an important characteristic of 
the Gramscian understanding of civil society – namely that civil society in Gramscian thought 
is considered to play a complex role being ‘dialectically a reformist and conservative force’. 
And further that hegemony and counter-hegemony are best seen as ‘simultaneous double 
movements that reciprocally shape each other’ (Katz 2006:334, 336). This implies that 
NGDOs should not necessarily reject to participate in global-decision making because of the 
dominance of a neoliberal agenda. Rather the organisations of GCS should contribute to the 
formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc extending beyond ‘classes’ by trying to engage agenda-
setting states and institutions in the social democratic agenda. And further wage a war of 
position to achieve hegemonic consciousness in marginalized groups to built up support for 
an alternative global economic agenda.  
Thus, in this understanding it is not the actual engagement in dialogue with hegemonic 
institutions that determines the hegemonic or counter-hegemonic nature of an organisation, 
but rather the capacity of the organisation to promote contention. In this regard, it has already 
been argued that NGDO coalitions have an increased potential to promote contention 
compared to existing TANs. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
 
As an alternative type of international cooperation among NGDOs the coalition model, as 
exemplified by ActionAid International and the ACT Alliance, can be expected to 
strengthen the potential for contention of international policy advocacy conducted by 
NGDOs through a range of unique features. Due to a more integrated model of 
collaboration as compared to existing organisations and networks conducting IPA, and 
generally stronger links to southern-based organisations, the operational structure of 
NGDO coalitions potentially provides a number of advantages in policy advocacy 
strategies. These include improved resources for research, a more diverse base of 
information, more influence in decision-making forums due to size and enhanced 
knowledge of leverage points and the capacity to act in unity. Possessing these advantages 
entails that NGDO coalitions, as compared to existing advocacy structures, have a greater 
potential to promote an agenda of social justice alternative to the predominant economic 
agenda both on grassroots level in the South and in global decision-making forums. 
 Further, can NGDO coalitions due to their organisational structure with emphasis on 
the inclusion of southern-based organisations be considered to promote a more equal 
structure in the global network of development organisations and to a certain degree 
increase resistance to co-optation from dominant states and IGOs. In general this entails 
that NGDO coalitions have the potential to strengthen links among organisations in 
opposition to the existing hegemony. 
 
In a neo-Gramscian perspective the features described here can all be considered to 
contribute to contending a hegemonic historic bloc. Considering the predominant 
presence of NGOs in the global civil society, the NGDO coalition model can be expected 
to significantly affect GCS in a contentious direction if the model becomes more 
widespread. However, pointing to a range of inadequacies of the organisations comprising 
GCS – primarily regarding the nature of these organisations – critics argue that the present 
structure of GCS cannot truly challenge the existing hegemony. NGDO coalitions cannot 
be expected to accommodate these inadequacies, so measured on these the formation of 
NGDO coalitions does not contribute significantly to the contentious features of GCS.
      CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
 68 
The differing outcomes from discussing the contentious potential of the organisations 
comprising GCS in a neo-Gramscian framework vis-à-vis the critical approach promoted 
in literature derive from inherently opposite perceptions of GCS. The GCS critics basically 
argue that to oppose a given structure, organisations have to operate outside this structure, 
preventing GCS at its present state from being truly contentious. While the neo-
Gramscian perspective acknowledges that hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces 
depend on and take shape after each other. Meaning that albeit the organisations 
comprising GCS in some areas share the nature and operational methods of the 
hegemonic forces, this does not eliminate the potential to contend the existing hegemony 
per se. 
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